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Abstract 
Considerable interest has arisen regarding irrigation water use in, especially, arid 
areas where competition for this scarce but crucial commodity is likely to 
intensify. The immediate implication is that user sectors, of which irrigated 
agriculture is the largest, must ensure efficient and conservative use of scarce 
water resources, using it sparingly and in high value I return economic activities. 
Central to the desire for efficient use, in a free market , is the role that proper 
pricing of water (so that its scarcity value is accurately reflected) could play in 
limiting farmers' derived short - run irrigation water demand, crop choices, and 
their choice of technology for irrigation. Using a multi- product firm framework, 
we have here constructed and modelled four central farm decision functions : the 
short - run demand function for irrigation water demand; the farmer's' crop choice 
decision; the choice of irrigation technology; and lastly, a crop output equation. 
We conclude that irrigation water price does not influence short - run irrigation 
water demand, neither does it affect the farmer's choice of crops or technology. 
Our fourth equation, the crop output equation, however, demonstrates the 
important role water plays in irrigation agriculture. Using farm budget data from 
Orange Free State and Transvaal, which are collected by the Directorate of 
Agricultural Economics for short - term planing purposes, we conclude that the 
apparent inefficacy of water costs as a tool for ensuring the efficient and 
conservative utilisation of irrigation water is due to the relatively negligible weight 
water inputs have relative to the farmers' capital and operating costs. Water prices 
alone can not , therefore, be relied upon as an effective tool for efficient water 





Water is crucial to life. The importance accorded water can be seen from the fact 
that it not only composes 70% of the human body, but also plays an important role 
in the production of the food and fibre that keeps man alive and in the industries 
that produce a myriad of products which are important to his sustenance. This 
statement, in effect, summarises the often - competing uses of water in domestic, 
industrial and agricultural uses, all of which uses have a bearing on the well -
being of man. Perhaps the following quote best illustrates the value, competition 
and the differing efficiency amongst competing sectors regarding water. 
"About 98% of food consumed by man is derived from cultivated crops, principally 
cereals that occupy about 10 per cent of the earth's land surface. The production of 
food and fibre consumes more water than any other - 80 per cent of man's uses. 
Further, water forms about 63 per cent of the dietary constituent of man's food. In 
industrial manufacturing, about 98 per cent of the water withdrawn is returned for 
reuse whereas only about 40 per cent is returned from irrigated agriculture." 
(Framji, 1983) 
It is perhaps the realisation of this that important word forums and treatises on 
water resource management have found a rooting. For example, Agenda 21, the 
policy statement on the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) addresses the need for integrated water resources 
management. 
A number of reasons could be advanced to explain the seemingly sudden surge in 
the urgency for adoption of appropriate policies related to water resource 
utilisation and management. First, the recognition of the economic value of 
resources and the need to protect the environment for sustainable development has 
led to general awareness and stress on conservation and reallocation of resources, 
including water, with appropriate pricing policies increasingly being relied upon as 
a measure for limiting waste and inefficient water use. 
Secondly, the failure of centralised, government irrigation water delivery systems 
to keep pace with expanding requirements for irrigation water facilities, against a 
backdrop of a less-than-optimal water pricing, coupled with pervasive 
subsidisation of irrigated agriculture, has led to a new emphasis on cost - sharing 
and decentralisation in agricultural, sanitary and domestic water provision more 
than previously. Central to this concern for cost - sharing, is the need for proper 
pricing for irrigation water. Wastage of irrigation water, even in areas of acute 
water scarcity, is commonplace and examples thereof abound in the irrigation 
literature. Wastage often takes the form of over - application, undue losses in the 
delivery system and uneconomic choice of crops (UN , 1976) and is often 
worsened by lack of monitoring, use of improper technology and is expressly 
encouraged by a pricing system that does not well reflect the scarcity value of the 
water resource. In other words, efficiency in use of water resources is simply 
lacking in a majority of the world's irrigation schemes. 
Thirdly, substantial doubt has been cast on the belief, all-too-common amongst 
policy makers, that water is 'a different good', a belief which fmmed the basis for 
price distortions where prices do not reflect the social marginal cost of its 
production and or delivery. Over time it has come to be realised that water is not 
so much 'different from other goods' so that distorting water prices do matter just 
as they do with any other inputs. Further more, economists working in the field of 
irrigated agriculture have often based their analyses in terms of 'crop water 
requirements' or 'demand' rather than 'farmers' demand for irrigation water, thus 
essentially reversing roles with agronomists. While the farmer's demand for water 
is a derived one -- derived from the final demand for his crops -- such analyses 
give the impression that the farmer has no choice over water application decisions 
but, rather, must simply agronomically determine what the crop's water 
requirements are and apply it regardless of underlying costs. This is, of course, not 
true. For example, (Vaux H.J., 1983) contends that a number of studies have 
indicated that the application of water by farmers is often in excess of the optimal 
application rates required to ensure that water is non - limiting in plant growth. 
This implies that carefully managed moisture stressing management and proper 
water scheduling might reduce the use of water for irrigation while having minimal 
impact on yields. The effect of such a strategy would be to substitute additional 
increments of irrigation for farmers' management and control of water use. It also 
implies that water savings can be achieved if the timing and quantity of irrigation 
applications are managed with a degree of precision not customarily observed if 
the frumer is sufficiently and effectively induced to do so. 
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Fourth, legal developments have added impetus to the need to deal with irrigation 
water in a free market and thus avoid distortions, especially in water scarce regions 
of the world. The adoption of riparian rights and the increased attention being 
accorded the sale of water rights, is increasingly leading to the emergence of water 
markets, a trend which South Africa will not be immune to indefinitely. To the 
extent that this phenomenon will find footing in South Africa, water will 
increasingly be put into use in those activities in which its value are high and a 
way from the 'water - is - a - different commodity' type uses, users and sectors. 
The evolution of property rights from the early common law's "regime of natural 
flow" doctrine in the pre - Industrial Revolution era, when there was relatively 
limited competition, and towards a "reasonable use" doctrine during the Industrial 
Revolution is perhaps an indication of what might be expected in terms of legal 
developments pertaining to water rights. Moreover, the issue of water rights must 
be addressed in tandem with any land reform policy process if programmes are to 
be balanced and lasting. 
Fifth, the great strides accomplished by science over the past three decades in 
inventing and implementing water - saving irrigation technologies is clearly 
waning. Perhaps the pace with which irrigation technology improvements have 
been led to increased efficiency in water utilisation in irrigation agriculture might 
not be repeated. Whereas it took long to advance irrigation technology since the 
invention of river - basin - flood - irrigation basin by the Babylonians in the 
Euphrates and the Egyptians on the banks of the Nile, the rapid developments that 
have culminated in more modem and efficient irrigation techniques, such as micro-
jet systems, most probably will not be repeated. What this suggests is that 
irrigation water resource management will rely less and less on new technological 
innovations and more and more on the economic tools of pricing and integrated 
management. 
Whatever the explanation for the recent heightened interest in sustainable water 
resource management and the central role that proper pricing can play, it is surely 
tme that agriculture will continue to rely on water as a key input. Water, in the 
form of precipitation, is correctly viewed as one of the most important factors 
determining the performance of the agricultural sector in any country at a given 
time. While precipitation is critical for arable farming, irrigation water is the 
single most important input in irrigated crop production. For areas with adequate 
3 
rainfall, agriculture is simply another on-site water use with no special 
considerations, apart from quality and quantity. Where water is scarce and rainfall 
generally low and the area arid, agricultural production has to rely on irrigation. 
Under such circumstances, virtually all irrigation water has to come from off-site 
sources such as rivers, dams and underground water. It is the severity of the 
rainfall scarcity problem that determines the combination of on -site and off- site 
water sources in agricultural production. 
Agricultural production requires various inputs and water is but one of them. For 
regions that are arid, availability of irrigation water becomes the most decisive 
single input in agricultural production (UN., 1976). Agricultural water demand1 is 
a function of several factors which includes the arable and irrigable land size, 
agricultural techniques, crop mix on irrigated land, substitutability of irrigated 
farming for dry - land farming, irrigation techniques, soil characteristics, political 
and economic policy, projected food and industrial crop demands, internal and 
world market signals for agricultural output I exports, macroeconomic policy, 
agricultural input price policy, legal structures controlling irrigation water, 
presence or absence of water markets, among others. Each of these and other 
factors, singly or together, determines agricultural water demand for irrigation 
purposes. 
1.2 Summary of South African Irrigation water situation 
Agriculture is the single largest consuming sector of South Africa's water 
resources. It is estimated that on average, 7, 877 m3 of water is applied per hectare 
annually to the more approximately 1,231 million hectares under irrigated 
agriculture." (Backeberg, 1993). The situation in South Africa with regard to 
irrigation water is perhaps best illustrated by Backeberg (1993). He reports that 
South African exploitable surface, underground and return flow volume of water is 
assessed at 38,666 million cubic metres in the year 2010. However, given the 
present state of technical knowledge, this volume of water is relatively fixed. Due 
to topographical and climatic factors, there is a skewed area distribution and 
seasonal variability of water supply. It is estimated that consumptive and non -
1 Agricultural water demand denotes all consumptive use of water related to either crop, livestock, fish 
ponds and even forestry. Irrigation water demand is thus a subset of agricultural water demand and refers 
to actual water utilisation in irrigated crop production. (See UN, 1976) 
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consumptive use will increase to a level of 25 888 million cubic metres by the year 
2010, with the share of irrigation water rising to 11, 885 million cubic metres. 
Furthermore, total desired utilisation is expected to increase above the available 
supplies after the year 2020. This means that solutions are urgently required to 
conserve and efficiently use the available water resources. Water savings, through 
more efficient irrigation techniques, proper pricing and integrated management 
will have to be adopted. Backeberg adds a dimension that helps focus attention 
not only on government irrigated schemes, with their subsidised rates, but also 
private irrigation schemes. Backeberg, (1993) notes that approximately 53 per cent 
of total water resources are utilised on private schemes, 25 per cent on co-
operative schemes and 22 per cent on government schemes. If the quest for water 
savings in agriculture is to be effective, efficient and effective strategies for use by 
the private irrigator are required. 
1.3 Dissertation focus and Presentation 
This dissertation addresses short - run irrigation water demand in South African 
agriculture and farmers' propensity to economise on water use via their response to 
water prices I cost, and crop and irrigation technology choice. To make the study 
more focused, and the results usable in a policy setting, only two regions, the 
Transvaal and the Orange Free state - the two regions for which data were 
available - are included in the analysis. The approach adopted in this paper is 
largely empirical, using 1994 farm budget data from the Directorate of 
Agricultural Economics. The paper is organised as follows : Chapter 2 reviews the 
irrigation water use literature and models. Chapter 3 begins with a review of the 
theory of the multi-product firm; this forms the theoretical basis for our subsequent 
analysis, and enables us to develop the short - run water demand, crop and 
irrigation technology choice, and output models. The data and study area are 
described in Chapter 3. Empirical estimation and analysis of results is contained 
in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 briefly addresses the policy implications of the 





The role of water in promoting agriculture has increasingly attracted the attention 
of many researchers within the scientific community in South Africa and 
elsewhere. These interests and research findings have contributed to the 
understanding of the role of water in irrigated agriculture. Many have contributed 
to the development of successful irrigation management strategies, improving 
agricultural productivity in arid areas as well as general water policy formulation. 
The literature on water - irrigated agriculture relations can broadly be divided into 
two groups. First is the work of agronomists and other production - oriented 
scientists whose focus is on establishing the level of water inputs necessary to 
achieve maximum yield per acre. They are mainly interested in the effect of water 
on plant growth and yield. The second group, who are more recent entrants into the 
field, are economists who focus largely on water - use efficiency, returns and on 
pricing considerations. 
This section reviews some of the literature that is related to the focus of the 
dissertation. Whereas it would have been more interesting if most of the literature 
reviewed pertained directly to the study area, there seems to be a general dearth 
of literature on the topic that directly discusses South Africa and that focuses on the 
microeconomics of water utilisation in agriculture in particular. Thus, most of the 
literature referred to and specifically the ones reviewed in this chapter are either 
drawn from, or uses data from, the western US, Australia or Israel. It is no 
coincidence that the US dominates much of the literature on water economics 
generally. This can be readily understood, given the arid nature of much of the 
western U.S. and the corresponding competition for, and value, of scarce water 
resources, coupled with the free market orientation of the US. This is, however, 
not a serious limitation of the present study since the reviewed literature provides 
methodologies and models that are relevant to the South African situation. The 
approach adopted in this section is to provide a detailed insight into a few of the 
more relevant models. Eleven such models are presented in the remaining sections 
of this chapter. Even though these models, and others, could be extended to analyse 
many of the decisions farmers must make with regard to their variable inputs, the 
focus in these studies on water as a variable makes these models particularly 
relevant to the present study. 
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2.2 Multicrop Inputs Allocation Model 
Moore, Gollehon and Carey (1992) have evaluated water prices as a determinant of 
producer decisions for four western regions of the USA. Their work attempts to 
analyse the importance of water prices in the choice of crops and the total acreage 
of land under irrigated agriculture using a multicrop model of irrigated agricultural 
production. They analyse farm firms in the western United States in which field 
crops are produced as a multi-output farm enterprise faced with a fixed allocable 
land constraint which forms 'jointness - in - production.' In this context, the farmer 
has four decisions to make: first he decides which crops to grow from the number 
of crops common to that area. This is a discret~ choice which can be estimated 
independently using dummy variables. The second decision is how much of the 
total land surface is to be allocated to the crops chosen after the first decision is 
made, which decision may conveniently be summarised as 'land use choice.' With 
the crop choice and land utilisation decisions made, the farmer I irrigator makes a 
'water supply decision' ('estimates' his water supply function) and, finally, a 'crop 
level water supply decision' that is dependent upon and influenced by among other 
things his land allocation decision. The crop choice decision may be depicted as: 
where 
di= f/p,r,b,N;x) i=l, ... ,m. (I) 
di 1s a discrete choice variable equal to I if crop i is grown and zero 
otherwise. 
pis a vector of crop prices, with Pi equal to the price of crop i, i= I, ... ,m; 
r is a vector of variable input prices except for water price; 
b is the irrigation water price; 
N is the land constraint ; 
nj is the land allocation to crop i; and, 
x is a vector of other variables exogenous to the farm or the crop 2 
However, the farmer must decide not only what crops to grow, as seen above, but 
also how much land to make available for each crop. In other words, the faimer 
has the problem of optimally allocating land amongst all the crops that he could 
possibly cultivate, subject to a land constraint. The land allocation function is thus 
a constrained optimisation problem of the form: 
2 Agricultural production, unlike that of manufacturing, is prone to the vagaries of weather, soil quality, 
irrigation technology, farm management, disease and the like, all of which are captured by this variable. 
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TI(p,r,b, N; x) 3 (2) 
m m 
= max { L 1r/ p, r, b, N; x) : L n
1 
= N} 
n n 1=1 i=1 
I" m 
Moore et al (1992) have shown that, given the normalised quadratic form for the 
profit functions the optimal land allocation function n; *(p,r,b,N;x) that solves (2) 
is linear in its parameters and thus the estimable form of the land allocation 
function is of the specification below: 
. m . z . . . t . 
n1*=a'+ L JJ1p1 + L fvrv+8b+t/N+ L r/sxs i = I, ... ,m. (3) J=I z=I s=I 
where a,l3,y,\V are parameter estimates and the other notations are as described 





. *(p,r,b,N;x);x} . 
. 1 l 1= 
(4) 
The crop supply and water demand functions are derived by applying Hoteling's 
lemma to (4). This yields the following supply functions4 : 
( b N· )- oTI(p,r,b,N;x) = y . p, r, , , x - _;:, 
l • up. 
l 
= y. ( p, r, b , n; ; x) 
l 
* o 1r. ( p. , r, b , n . ; x) 
1 1 l 
op. 
1 
i = l, ... ,m. 
(5) 
Applying Hoteling's lemma to the firm's crop- specific profit function gives the 
short - run water demand as formulated below: 
* 01r.(p,r,b,n. ;x) 
l l = w.(p . ,r,b,n;;x), 
1 1 
i = 1, . . . , m (6) 
op. 
l 
3 This is the firm's multi-output profit function 
4 The authors note that two forms of supply functions are possible from the Hoteling's lemma application 
above but have opted to use (5) in their analysis since (5), unlike the alternative, treats crop prices 
explicitly., 
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By normalising the quadratic form of the profit function, re. (p . , r, b, n; ; x), both 
l l 
the crop allocation function fYi( p, r, b, N; x)] and the water demand functions 
[wiCPi, r, b, n;* ; x)] take a form that is not only estimable, but also linear in the 
exogenous variables. The two estimable equations take the following forms: 
. m . z . . . t . 
Yi=d + "Lkjp1 + L tvrv+tb+p
1N+ "Lv~xs i=l, ... ,m (7) 
J=l v=l s=l 
and 
z t 
wi = J +J Pi+ "Lm~ rv + ,/b +Bini+ Lt~xs i=l, ... ,m (8) 
v=l s=l 
·Regression equations are estimated using primary, cross section data from the 1984 
and 1988 Farm and Irrigation Ranch Survey (FRIS), a survey of operators of 
irrigation farms by the US Department of Commerce. American irrigators use both 
ground and surface water, with ground water assumed to be the marginal source 
when both sources are used. Where the former source is used, an engineering 
formula that calculates ground water pumping lift is used to compute the marginal 
pumping costs in dollars per hectare foot unit. This is then used as the proxy for 
price with an additional assumption that government ground water institutions I 
sellers of water, and their agencies, do not impose binding constraints for water on 
irrigators. 
The variables used in estimating the four equations, correspond to the four choices 
already outlined and include the number of farms, farm area, water applied per acre 
foot, water price (normalised), pumping depth, pumping pressure, cooling degree 
days, growing season precipitation, normalised wage rates, bulk gasoline prices, 
count of farms in which each of the crops in the region was cultivated, mean water 
applied and mean output per crop in units per acre-feet per farm. Equations (3) and 
(7), corresponding to the land allocation and supply functions are estimated using 
the Tobit procedure while the water demand equation is estimated using the 
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Heckman model. 5 The crop choice model, being a qualitative variable analysis, 
logically requires that a Probit model be used. 
Their empirical findings indicated that the water price coefficient was significant at 
the extensive margin, but statistically insignificant with regard to short - run, crop 
level, water demand. This, most importantly, implies that once farmers in the 
region have made their land allocation decisions, water price does not feature 
effectively in their decision about short - run water use. In other words, the price 
elasticity of demand for irrigation water is low. This important finding supports 
those of Just et al (1990b), Alouze C.M (1991), Antle and Hatchett (1986), and 
Zilberman et al (1990) and Clayton et al (1989). Water price thus 'affects' only the 
firm's profit function, and its crop-choice, irrigation technology and land allocation 
decisions. The conclusion from their research is that once decisions regarding crop 
choice and land allocation are made at the beginning of the planting season, water 
price is largely irrelevant. They also conclude that the farm level demand for water 
is highly price inelastic for every region. 
2.3 Just et al's Behavioural input allocation model 
Just et al (1990) use two approaches for allocating variable input allocations 
among production activities (multicrop decisions.) One approach relies on 
behavioural rules for input allocations and notes that farmers follow some 
acceptable 'rule of thumb' in deciding on input allocation decisions. The second 
approach is based on profit maximisation. The model implies that input use 
responds instantaneously to changes in input and output prices. The exact 
structures of the models are explained, and their empirical findings are reported 
below in this section and in section 2.4. 
The motivation of the authors for designing the model was to develop acceptable 
techniques for examining the input allocation issue in a multi - output framework. 
In this model, farmers are portrayed as behaving as if their production functions 
followed constant returns to scale with fixed input/land ratios. The ratios employed 
5 This is an econometric, qualitative choice model akin to the Tobit model but which is more suited for 
discriminant analysis. See Madalla G.S. for an in-depth review of the procedure. 
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are based on regional averages modified for season and for farm specific -
conditions. The behavioural input allocation model may be formally developed and 
expressed as follows; 
where 
k 
Xjit = L xk .. t 
k=l Jl 
i = number of farmers (i=l,2, .. I); 
k = crops (k=l,2, .. ,K); 
j = inputs (j=l,2, .. ,J); 
t = years (t=l,2, .. ,T); 
(9) 
Xjit = the aggregate quantity of input} used by farmer i at time t.; and, 
Xkjit = is the unobserved quantity of input} allocated by farmer i at time t 
to crop k. 
Since the model assumes farmer's production functions exhibit constant returns to 
scale, the individual farmer's decisions consist of the choice of the particular 
variable input I land ratios to adopt and how much land to allocate to each crop. It 
follows that since Xkjit = Xjit I Lkit is the quantity of input} per unit of land used at 
time t by farmer i in producing crop k; thus: 
where 
* 
xkJit = akJ +/3Ji + rJi (10) 
Ukj is the average regional use of variable input j per unit of land in the 
production of k throughout the period of analysis; 
/3 Ji are deviations from for use of j at time t; and, 
r . . are deviations of i from the regional average for use of input J . 
JI , 
From (9) and (10) the components of x*kjit which may be estimated are: 
k 
x .. 1 = L ( ak. + /3 .. + r .1 ) Lki + s . -1 JI k=l g JI J t JI (11) 
where 
11 
EJit is a random deviation associated with farmer i and input j at time t 
and is normally and independently distributed. 
The empirical estimation of ( 11) involves regressing each variable input on the area 
of the farm allocated to each of the crops. The parameter estimates a kj + pi) + y Jt 
give a per acre estimate of variable input j to crop k by farmer i at time t. The 
product of this estimate and the total land area allocated to a particular crop is the 
behavioural estimate of the allocation of input j to crop k by farmer i at time t. 
This can be formally depicted as: 
(12) 
where the subscript b denotes the behavioural model. The model was empirically 
applied and tested with· Israeli data to determine the effect of two inputs: water (the 
most scarce local input and the major constraint to development in the region) and 
'other' inputs (derived as aggregated normalised expenses on other inputs) Just et al 
(1990.) Ordinary least squares parameter estimates of (12) were reported for five 
crops · (outputs): bell peppers, tomatoes, onions, melons and egg plant. The 
important conclusion which is relevant to the focus of this dissertation is that 
whereas water use per area did not seem to differ between the regions, all farmers 
responded to water price stimuli by using less water over the period reviewed. The 
model thus confirmed the importance of prices as a policy tool in water 
conservation and utilisation among farmers . This is a significantly different result 
from their own model (Just et al (1990b) reviewed in section 2.4, in which water 
prices are portrayed as largely irrelevant in the farmers' input decision. The 
conclusion also contrasts those of Carrey et al (1992), Alouze C.M (1991), Antle 
and Hatchett (1986), Zilberman et al (1990) and Clayton et al (1989) but concurs 
with the conclusions of Howitt et al (1980), Burt et al (1990) and Kim et al (1989.) 
2.4 The Profit maximisation Approach to Allocation of inputs 
Just et al (1990b) have an alternative model that they have used to empirically 
estimate the allocation of inputs (and specifically, water) by farmers . This is what 
they call the "profit maximisation approach" to allocation of inputs or, simply, the 
'profit maximisation model.' In this model, farmers are assumed to be driven by 
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profit maximisation objectives. As such, the short - run profit maximisation 
problem of the farm firm may be formally expressed as: 
s. t . Qkit = f kit (X klit 'X k2it '· .... ' X kjit ,Lkit, 
k=l,2, .... ,k 
(13) 
k 
xk .. t = L xk .. t 
CJI k=I CJI 
where 
Qkit is output of k by farmer i at time t. 
P kt is the price of output k at time t; 
~t is the price of input} (water) at time t; and, 
~t is i's production function for output k at time t. 
XkJi is the unobserved quantity of input j allocated by i to crop k. 
The first order condition (F.O.C.) that determines the variable input is 
- ofkit - .. _ 
J.t - pkt oX ' k-1, ... ,K, J-1, ... ,J kjit 
(14) 
Converting the F.O.C. expression (14) into elasticities gives: 
(15) 
where ekjit = (of kit I oxkjit )(xkjit I Qkit) is a non-constant elasticity (at its optimal 
solution) of variable input j in the production of k by farmer i at time t . 




akJ is a crop effect; 
bfi the farm effect; and, 
c11 is the time ( or technology) effect. 
Then, one can merge (16) into (15) and aggregate over crops, yielding an estimable 
form: 
k Rkit 
X .. 1 = L (ak . +b .. +c -1)-+i; ··1 J1 k=l g J1 1 wJt J1 , 
(17) 
j = 1, .. . ,1; 
i = 1, .. . ,1; 
t=l, .. . ,T; 
where 
i;Ji1is an iid random deviation associated with farmer i, variable input} and 
crop k at time t. 
The model then uses the parameters estimated in the above equation ( 17) to 
translate revenue data into profit - maximising estimates of variable input allocation 
among the different crops. This is accomplished by the equation below: 
A A A A Rkit 
xl!.t =ak. +b .. +c ·,)--
)1 g J1 J wJt 
(18) 
where 
a kj is crop effect parameter estimate of ( 17) 
A 
b Ji is a farm effect parameter estimate of ( 17) 
c Jt is the time ( or technology effect) parameter estimate of ( 17) 
The parameter estimates of equation (17) on the Israeli data, using OLS, led to two 
conclusions: first, while the 'time' and 'crop effects', as previously defined, are 
significant, the 'farmer effects' are not significantly different from zero; and 
secondly and more importantly, the elasticity of the water variable was found to be 
very low amongst crops ranging from 0.011 for bell peppers to 0.046 for melons. 
These low elasticities could be interpreted as implying that water prices had 
minimal influence on the farmers' water use decision. This finding contrasts their 
own model reviewed in section 2.3 Just et al (1990a), as· it does those of Howitt et 
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al (1980), Bmt et al (1990) and Kim et al (1989.) This finding is, however, similar 
to those arrived at by Carrey et al (1992), Alouze C.M (1991), Antle and Hatchett 
(1986), Zilberman et al (1990) and Clayton et al (1989.) 
2.5 Antle and Hatchett's Dynamic Input Decision model 
Antle J.M and Hatchett S. A. (1986) have used a dynamic model which employs 
sequential decision - making on irrigation water use by farmers. They adopt the 
plausible argument that intermediate output decisions may be endogenous to final 
output and that intermediate inputs are likely to be correlated with one another and 
with variables such as acreage. This implies that a single equation estimation of 
input use (such as the last three models reviewed) is inherently biased and thus 
econometrically undesirable. In this dynamic approach, crop production and 
decisions regarding input usage are regarded as constituting a dynamic optimisation 
problem. The model assumes a three - stage decision problem.6 With this 
assumption, the sequential decisions model is formally specified as: 
where 
n = profit; 
p = output price; 
y 3 = final output; 
r1 = price of input x; 
r = price of output z; and, 
n = information on which input decision is based. 
(19) 
Further, technology is represented by the following equations, each representing 
production functions at each stage: 
6 Dynamic programming models normally assume multi-stage decision points where decisions are 





e I is a random component7 
and 
for t= (1,2,3.) 
(20) 
(21) 
Yt-J is the previous state of the crop8 and which embodies the impact of 
all previous inputs applied 
Given the embodiment of the previous input allocation decisions (water applied in 
stages 1 and 2) in the later stage (in this case stage 3 because t = 1,2,3 .), the 
composite production function may be written as~ 
(22) 
At stage 1, a variable input x1 and a fixed input z (land) are chosen, with the choice 
dependent on the farmer's price expectations, future crop states and decision rules 
for future optimal levels of subsequent outputs in the next two stages denoted as 
x*2 and x*3 and which themselves are: 
x\ = x\(r2, Y1, W2) 
x* 3 = x* lr3, Y2, W3) 
(23) 
(24) 
where w1 is a parameter that reflects the farmer's subjective evaluation, at time t, of 
future output and prices. The farmer's decision at stage 1 is to choose levels of x1 
and z to solve: 
(25) 
subject to (20) and (21) 
7 In agricultural production, the random error component could be ex1)lained by factors such as weather, 
diseases, etc. 
8 For example, if the farmer is currently at the beginning of last stage, 3, since t= l ,2,3., the farmer looks 
at the state of the crops .Y2, at the end of last decision stage ,2, before making a final decision about how 
much water to apply in this final stage, Y 1 and y3 are defined in a similar manner. 
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At the end of stage 1, the farmer, having applied x1 to z, now knows y1 and E 1. 
Technically speaking, it is not possible for the farmer to literally observe E1. Neither 
is y 1 , the intermediate crop stage and end of stage 1, directly observable. It, 
however, does contain information about stage 1 output which the farmer uses as a 
base in deciding input usage at stage 2. Based on this information, the farmer is 
ready for stage 2. 
At the beginning of stage 2, the farmer observes Yi, and makes his decision about 
x2 based not only on his observation of y 1 but also his expectation of x* 3. Thus, he 
confronts an optimisation problem which may be denoted as: 
(26) 
With this information, the farmer is set for stage 3. At the start of the third stage, 
the farmer observes the crop state, y2 and chooses the final level of input, x3 , to 
solve his optimisation problem which is: 
(27) 
subject to (19) and (20) 
The intuitive appeal of this dynamic model results from the fact that it allows for 
the effect of input use at stage 1, through its influence on output y 1 ( crop state at 
end of stage 1) to influence the input use at stage 2, with the sequence ending at 
stage 3. Obviously, the number of stages would vary from one crop to the next as 
well as on farm managerial decisions. 
To empirically apply the model, Antle and Hatchett (1986) estimated two 
equations using data for irrigated wheat production in the Imperial Valley of 
California. Data used in the analysis included, yield, variety, planting date, acreage 
and field locations, date and amount of water applied, an index of soil quality, a 
variable capturing evaporation and a set of management dummy variables to 
account for differences across farms. Their results give different water demand 
elasticities for the stages used in the analysis. They conclude that the elasticity of 
demand for water was high in stage 1 but low in stage 3. In terms of this model, 
therefore, the efficacy of prices as a policy tool for the analysis of farmer's response 
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or as a conservation tool depends on the type of crop and the differing water 
requirement across the various growth stages of the crops in question. 
2.6 The inter - temporal irrigation water demand model 
The inter - temporal irrigation water demand model formulated by C.M. Alouze 
(1991) seeks to provide a theoretical framework and empirical test of farmers' 
response to water scarcity signals between seasons and years. The logical 
underpinning of the model is based on the observation that water is most valuable 
during drought (when it is scarce) and that rationality dictates that farmers not only 
save water for use during such drought periods (an inter - temporal allocation) but 
also choose to grow only valuable crops (the crop choice response to the water 
scarcity signal.) The model thus addresses one of the focal points of this study, 
viz., do water scarcity signals (price or otherwise) determine or shape farmers' crop 
choice decisions? The issue of land I acreage allocation per crop is, however , not 
explicitly addressed by the model. 
Alouze postulates that the demand for water in irrigated agriculture is a derived 
demand. As such, the quantity required by farmers depends on, amongst other 
things, the value of the crop it produced, as measured by product (crop) price, the 
nature of technology employed in the production of the output, the prices of 
competing and complementary inputs, and the soil moisture content at the 
beginning of the irrigation season. The importance of inter-temporal water 
allocation in irrigation water demand management is based on the fact that 
hydrological drought and agricultural drought need not coincide. 9 It is this 
distinction that makes inter - temporal transfers ( and with them temporal pricing 
and fanner response) tenable and dam construction necessary. Although the model 
uses a single crop irrigation farm firm's response to water scarcity signals by using 
a two period inter-temporal allocation decision framework, the methodology can be 
used in a multi-crop context. The model's single crop inter-temporal production 
function may be written as: 
y = q(w,x) (28) 
9 Hydrological drought refers to periods of below average water levels in reservoirs and streams and low 




y is the output in each period ; 
w is soil moisture (it is a random variable in the second period Wand a 
known variable (w) in the first period); and, 
x is the level of applied water (xi for period 1 and x2 for period 2.) 
The farmer's decision is the choice of levels of xi and si (defined below) so as to 
maxuruse: 
E[n:] = p.q(w,xi) + bEfp.q(w,x2)] -bPw(si + E[S])-F(l+b) (29) 
subject to: 
where 




Xo is the farmer's water right (allocation) for each period; 
F is the fixed cost paid for Xo for each period; 
S is the sales water purchasable by the farmer in each period; 
Pw is the price of S; 
s is the sales water available in first period and is known but random, 
S, in the second period; 
p is output price (known in first period) but random ,P, in the second; 
a is a storage loss discount factor in storing water from period 1 to 2; 
and, 
b is a discount rate applicable for second period's revenues and cost. 
Expressing (29) as a Lagrangean function results in (30) 
L = p.q(w,xi) + bEfp.q(w,x2)] - bPw(si + E[S])-F(l+b) + Yi(x0 (1+1/a)+si-xi) + 
Y2(s-si.) (30) 
Assuming, as the model does, that the price of sales water (P wJ is low relative to its 
value in production, and further that all water offered for sale is purchased (si=s), 




ab is the product of the discount rate due to time preference ( b) and the 
discount factor due to storage loss ( a . ) 
Equation (31) can be interpreted to mean that the value of water applied in Season 
1 is chosen so as to maximise the marginal product of water applied in the first 
season, which should be equal to the discounted expected value of the marginal 
product of water applied in the second season. 
The model was applied in the context of a farm in the state of Victoria, Australia, 
during the 1982 - 1983 period. The important conclusion, given the assumptions of 
the model, was that there is a zero probability that the farmer's annual allocation of 
water (both x0 + s ) will correspond to the optimal water requirement of period 1 
when climatic variability, economic factors (water input and agricultural output 
prices) and inter - temporal decisions are taken into account. The reason for this 
conclusion is that the cost of water is so low relative to its value in production that 
farmers largely ignore prices in making water application decisions. This implies a 
low price elasticity of demand for water. This conclusion supports those of Carrey 
et al (1992), Just et al (1990b), Caswell et al (1990), Antle and Hatchett (1986), 
and Clayton et al (1989.) It contrasts the findings contained in the studies by Just et 
al (1990a), Howitt et al (1980), Burt et al (1990) and Kim et al (1989.) 
2. 7 Caswell et al's (1990) Conceptual Farm Level Model 
Caswell M, Litchenberg E. and Zilberman D (1990) address the issue of cost -
effective alternatives to addressing the resource scarcity, and externality problem in 
what they have called a 'conceptual farm level model.' In particular, and of special 
relevance to this dissertation, they examine the impact of increased water prices 
and the adoption of water - conserving irrigation technologies on water use 
efficiency, yields and profitability, among other things. Cotton production in the 
Western San Joaquin Valley in California is investigated. Their per acre production 
function is given as: 
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where 
q = f(e) 
q is output per acre ; and 
e is 'effective water' 10. 
(32) 
Likewise the irrigation cost function is given as: 
where 
Ci(a) =Ii+ a (Vi+ w) 
I is fixed cost per acre ; 
w is price of water per acre foot ; 
i denotes technology used ; and 
Vj is land quality parameter. 
(33) 
Given the production and cost functions above, the fanner's optimisation problem 
can be stated as: 
where 
IT; (a)= max{pf (h; ( a).a)-1; -a(v; +w)-x. a. g; ( a) 11 (34) 
a, 
P is the price of the crop ; 
x is an anti- pollution tax ; 12 
Ili( a) is quasi rent per acre associated with technology i ; and 
x.a.gi(a) is the internalised cost of pollution. 
The optimal water application level ( ai( a), which is itself a function of land quality 
and the technology used) is determined by solving: 
IO 'Effective water' is defined as the amount of water actually taken up by the crop's root system. It is 
seldom the case that · applied water' is the same as · effective water' even though improved, water 
conserving technologies such as drip irrigation tend to reduce, not eliminate, the disparity between the two. 
11 The last term of this equation, i.e. internalised cost of pollution, even though an important 
consideration in water resource utilisation has been dropped from subsequent analysis since it neither 
addresses the focus of the dissertation nor is does dropping it compromise the structural specification of the 
model. 
12 The model introduces an anti- pollution tax as a means of dealing with externalities associated with 
water use in irrigated agriculture. Even though it is not directly relevant to the focus of the dissertation, 
their treatment of water use response to prices is especially relevant. 
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(35) 
Denoting the cost of 'applied water' as ut (a) and that of 'effective water' as 
u;e (a) , both water prices may be written as : 
ut (a) = w + Vi + xgi(a) and 
u;e(a) = ut(a) I hi(a) 
This implies that (35) can be re-written simply as: 
which is the marginal efficiency condition for resource allocation. 
The estimated model is formulated as 
N J 
<p(M' s' P) = IT IT Mn !(MnSn) rl P,,f M.snj 
n=I J= I 
where 
n denotes the region for n = 1, .. ,N; 





Snj denotes the number of farms adopting water - conserving technologies; 
MnSnj is the number of plots using technology j in sub - region n ; 
Mis a 1 by N vector of Mn; and 
Pis a Nby J matrix of Pnf 
The log-likelihood function for estimating equation (38) becomes 
N J 
log f (M,S,P)=LMnLS"'logPn1 (39) 
n=I J= I 
Caswell et al (1990) have demonstrated that when the data from the sample is of 
equal size, i.e. Snj and P observations are equal to Mn', the log-likelihood function 
(39) simplifies to a form (40) that is estimable: 
N J 
log f (S' P) = L L snj log P,,j (40) 
n=I J= I 
Water cost, on the other hand, is given as the product of water use per acre and the 
cost of water (as measured in dollars per acre foot unit). More formally: 
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WnJ = UnJ . ZnJ 
where 
UnJ water use per acre ; and 
ZnJ cost of water per acre foot I 3. 
(41) 
It is important to note that, in a sense, California presents a classic case of a water 
scarce region in which competition for, and value of water in, production has 
become increasingly high. That is, agriculture in California is susceptible to water 
supply shortages much as are several regions of South Africa. The extent of the 
adoption of water - conserving technologies and high value tree crops is a logical 
response by profit maximising farmers to water scarcity signals. 
The study used primary data collected by farm advisors from six counties of the 
San Joaquin Valley. Data was collected for five perennial crops: grapes, deciduous 
fruits ( apricots, nectarines and peaches), walnuts, pistachios and almonds in each of 
the regions. The model was estimated using the maximum likelihood procedure, i.e. 
it estimated the log-likelihood, or probability, of adopting water - conserving 
technologies, as opposed to traditional (non-water efficient) techniques, given crop 
choice and farm location (i.e. where, amongst the three counties of the San 
Joacquim Valley the farm is situated). Specifically, the model gives particular 
attention to the effect of crops and location on the odds that a particular technology 
will be adopted. Other variables included in the model are the water-cost 
differential between the traditional and modem water - conserving technologies, 
and a dummy variable which captures the use of ground water versus surface water. 
The authors arrived at four major conclusions. First, the results rejected the 
hypothesis that the elasticity of the odds of adoption of water - conserving 
techniques with respect to its water-cost saving (calculated to be .028) is equal to 
zero. Secondly, the results indicated clearly that farmers who use underground 
water (the more expensive source option) are more likely to adopt water - saving 
techniques than are their counterparts who use surface water. This is an impo1tant 
finding given that surface water, which is often in the domain of public authorities, 
is often sold at less than its market value in contrast to underground water which 
13 The cost of water used by a sub - region is the sum of the cost of obtaining the water (the pumping cost 
for ground water or the price paid to a water district for surface water) and the cost of pressurisation. 
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has to be pumped at great cost and which price, therefore, closely approximates its 
marginal value. Thirdly, they failed to reject the hypothesis that there are no 
regional differences in the odds of adoption. This suggests that farmers rationally 
adopted water - conserving technologies across each of the sub-regions. Their 
fourth finding, which is also relevant to this paper, concerns the differences among 
crops ( analogous to the 'crop - choice decision' issue) in the acceptability of water 
conservation technologies. Their results demonstrated that growers of relatively 
less valuable crops, almonds and pistachios, have a higher likelihood of adopting 
water - conserving technologies than those farmers who grew the other, more 
valuable crops in the sample. This finding concurs with those of Howitt et al 
(1980), Kim et al (1989), and Clayton et al (1989). 
2.8 Howitt et al's Quadratic programming model 
In their review of the analyses of various derived demand functions for irrigation 
water as estimated for California by several authors, Howitt et al (1980) show that 
most derived - demand and linear programming models used to estimate derived 
irrigation water demand models underestimate elasticities. To demonstrate their 
contention, and as an alternative estimation procedure, they develop and 
empirically apply a quadratic programming model for the derived demand for 
irrigation water, which they estimate and compare with linear programming 
models. The quadratic programming problem is specified as 
where 
max [d - Yi Dx]'x (42) 
s.t Ax ~b x:?0 
A is an nm vector of coefficients from linear production functions relating 
each of the m input factors needed to produce a unit of output; 
d contains elements of the demand intercepts; 
D is an n by n matrix of own price slope coefficients; and 
x denote outputs 




BQ is the subset of A which is the basis matrix for the quadratic solution. 
Formulating ( 43) in terms of a Lagrangean and applying Kuhn - Tucker conditions, 
the constraint for the dual quadratic problem is derived as: 
where 
A'A + Dx ~d (44) 
A' is interpreted as the value of the marginal products of the constraining 
resources14 
Assuming that the farmers are profit maximisers, the quadratic dual values ( a vector 
of marginal revenue products) can be written as: 
(45) 
Substituting ( 43) into ( 45) and differentiating with respect to b yields; 
d)., =-BI-IDB -I 
db Q • Q (46) 
The above equation forms the basis of the model. It indicates that within any given 
set of crops, the farmer's valuation of water resources "changes in response to 
changes in the quan~ties available and that they will do so in an expected 
direction." Howitt et al (1980). 
The model was applied to annual crops in California. It is, however, assumed that 
for short - run optimal agricultural water allocation decisions, the capitalised loss to 
the individual grower who prefers tree and bush crops ( on the grounds that they are 
relatively more drought resistant), exceeds the annual opportunity cost of water 
used for the alternative, i.e. field crops. Fourteen regions were chosen, based on 
homogeneity of climate, soil types, water costs and availability. Alternative farm 
14 ')....' is itself defined as')....' = c•'B1 where c* is defined as an m by 1 partition of the output price vector c 
associated with the basis of activities x • . 
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activities (crops) are considered in the analysis where water, land and energy costs, 
among others, are the constraints the farmer faces. It is clear that the model is a 
short - run irrigation water demand model for California's agriculture, and it 
specifically attempts to accounts for shifts in production mix, surface I ground 
water ratios, and for price effects relating to 'California's volatile but valuable 
vegetable crops' Howitt et al ( 1980). This corresponds to the crop choice and the 
water supply decisions that this paper addresses. 
Two striking conclusions are made by the authors. First, they conclude that the 
demand for irrigation water in the study area is significantly elastic, especially in 
the $25-35 per acre - foot price range. This contrasts with the findings by Carrey et 
al (1992), Just et al (1990b), Alouze C.M (1991), Antle and Hatchett (1986), 
Caswell et al (1990) and Clayton et al (1989) but concurs with the results of studies 
by Just et al (1990a), Burt et al (1990) and Kim et al (1989). Secondly, they 
conclude that, for a given uniform irrigation technology, farmers respond to water 
scarcity signals implicit in high water costs in the study area, by choosing more 
valuable 'water economising' crops. In their own words, "it can be seen that the 
value of the marginal product (VMP) or marginal revenue product (MRP), 
respectively, will be equated to the aggregate water cost." Howitt et al (1980, page 
627). This finding concurs with those of Caswell et al (1990), Clayton et al (1989) 
and Kim et al (1989). 
2.9 Burt et al's Sequential decisions irrigation model 
Burt's study deviates slightly from the others reviewed in that it analyses irrigation 
in a subhumid climate. It thus offers a contrast to the predominantly dry - region -
centred studies and underscores the fact that irrigation agriculture is not exclusive 
to arid regions. Farmers in such areas may be driven by other considerations in 
making decisions regarding investments in irrigation, water use, water conservation, 
irrigation technology type, crop choice, land allocation and related. As the authors 
note, "irrigation development is likely to be dominated by individual faim or 
relatively small community developments as contrasted to the large reclamation 
projects characteristic of arid regions." Burt et al (1990, P. 16). The need for 
irrigation, however, is necessitated by the fact that although precipitation is fairly 
high in such climates, its variability presents a grave risk to farmers. Temporal 
considerations are thus important. 
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The formal statement of the model begins with the premise that farmers wish to 
maximise their returns to investments in irrigation and will therefore strive to 
allocate their limited funds to the various investment categories that comprise a 
working irrigation system. These components are: 
x = water storage capacity; 
y = distribution capacity; 
z = acres developed for irrigation; 
Nt (x, y, z) = expected value measure; and 
It (x, y, z) = investment cost. 
The problem that the farmer faces is well summarised by the following statement : 
" Thus for a given developed acreage and at a particular point in the irrigation season, 
either water supply as determined by x or distribution capacity, y, may limit the total 
amount of irrigation water applied. Distribution capacity will be a limitation predictable 
with certainty but, but for a given supply constraint, will be a random variable when 
looking ahead at time t." Burt et al (1990, P. 34). 
The study thus analyses the intraseasonal, short period allocation decision, and the 
interseasonal (annual) decision. The dynamic model uses the following general 
class of production functions: 
where 
M 
1//( y) = h ( L Bi ( w;)) ' 
i = I 
Y = crop yield; 
\Jf = is a monotonic transformation of Y; and, 
h & e are arbitrary functions. 
(47) 
The specific formulation of the sequential model adopts the usual convention of 
dynamic programming, in which growth stages are counted from the end, and is of 
the form: 
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for n = 2,3, ... ,M 
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where 
Subject to. G(u) ~ s2 
u~D 
si M = a partial sum of terms for the production function that measure 
crop condition; 
Si" = water in storage; 
un = net irrigation water applied; 
vn = precipitation ; 
G(un) = gross amount of water that must be withdrawn from storage or 
pumped; 
c( un) = expected costs associated with the decision to apply un units of 
water; 
!'(sin, s2n) = expected net return from an n stage process under an optimal 
policy when where the initial state is that defined by sin and s2n (the criteria 
is maximum value of expected net returns) n= 1,2, .. ,M; 
f(sio, s2D) = R(siO), the net harvest value of the crop; and 
w. = a vector of climatic and cultural variable but which is assumed to be I 
made up of the sum of precipitation and net irrigation water denoted 
w only. 
This model was empirically applied to com irrigation in central Missouri. The 
study focused on farm level investment in com irrigation. The authors selected 
water and temperature as the most critical 'climatic' factors affecting com yield. 
Apart from these two climatic factors, agronomic variables, fertiliser and plant 
population were added to the model to explain the yield response surface. Four 
discrete states were used in the analysis. The variables used in the analysis are 
given below as: 
vt = precipitation; 
ut = irrigation water applied; 
wt= sum of irrigation water and precipitation truncated from below 
0.35"; 
Tr = sum of daily maximum temperatures; 
T1 * = sum of the proportion of daily maximum temperature exceeding 
85°F and 90°F · 
' 
11 = T1 * .JMax ( 0, w1 - • 3 5) an interaction variable between water and 
high temperatures fort= 1,2, ... 6. 
The actual equation estimated is : 
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The important conclusion from the study was that the greater the price of water, 
the more the conservation of water is an optimal policy among farmers. In other 
words, water prices do influence the amount of irrigation water applied. In their 
own words "at higher values (higher water prices) successively smaller and smaller 
applications of water are made at a given stage and state; also applications are made 
at fewer states." Burt et al (1990,P. 11) This finding corroborates those of Just et 
al (1990a), Howitt et al (1980) and Kim et al (1989) but contrasts the findings of 
Carrey et al (1992), Just et al (1990b), Alouze C.M (1991), Antle and Hatchett 
(1986), Caswell et al (1990) and Clayton et al (1989). 
2.10 Clayton et al's Pumping Costs Response Model 
This model is based on data from the western USA and presents a water demand 
analysis based on a sample of 1927 farm observations in sixteen western states 
drawn from the 1984 Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey (FRIS). The authors 
contend that as the water scarcity problem intensifies, competition is likely to 
increase between urban and industrial water users, and agricultural water users. 
This is likely to lead to higher water cost being reflected in either higher annual 
charges or capitalised into higher land costs. Since all the farmers in their sample 
irrigated exclusively with groundwater, the study uses farmers' estimates of energy 
costs as a proxy for the price of water. Furthermore, farmers in the survey planted 
various field crops and used various water conservation methods. The essence of 
this model and the central thrust of their investigation which is relevant to the focus 
of the present dissertation, is that of farmers' per hectare water use response to price 
changes. The study also addresses the changes in the acreage of widely grown 
15 The authors actually deleted the first and last time period and found out that the difference is trivial 
and therefore simplified the model to include only four periods, t=2,3,4 & 5. 
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crops16 in response to perceived water pumping cost variation, which was a proxy 
for water price. This is quite similar to the present paper's focus on fanners' 
allocative decisions (i.e., the area of land per crop) as a response to changes in 
water prices. The following equation was estimated, using ordinary least squares, 
for each of the three climatic regions17 and then for all the climatic regions 
combined: 
where 
In (Q) = f31 + f32 In (p) + 518 (51) 
Q = the producer's water application ( centimetre per land unit); 
P = Energy costs used in pumping in dollars per 1000 m3; 
/3.s = parameter estimates; and 
& = a stochastic error term. 
The authors arrived at four important conclusions. First was the finding that water 
use per hectare (Q), was quite unresponsive to its price. This supports the 
conclusions of Carrey et al (1992), Just et al (1990b), Alouze C.M (1991), Antle 
and Hatchett (1986) and Caswell et al (1990) who found water prices did not 
feature prominently in fanners' irrigation water application decision. This study 
reported a price elasticity of -0.26. This is in contrast to the findings of Just et al 
(1990a), Howitt et al (1980), Burt et al (1990) and Kim et al (1989). 
Secondly, fanners in the high CIR19 region were more dependent on irrigation 
throughout the growing season and tended to substitute cotton for small grains 
grown in the other two regions' (Clayton et al, 1989, Page 770) . This conclusion 
16 The crops studied were com grain, com for silage, grain sorghum, wheat, barley, soybeans, dry edible 
beans, other small grains, alfalfa, other hay, cotton, sugar beets, and Irish potatoes. 
17 The study divided the sixteen states covered in the sample into three regions based on the consumptive 
irrigation requirement (CIR) of a reference crop, alfalfa. The CIR considers both the evapo-transpiration 
need of a 'well watered' alfalfa and rainfall. A high CIR meant that the region relied on or needed 
irrigation more. 
l8 The study actually estimated linear, log-log and quadratic forms ofthis equation. However, they report 
only on the log - log functional form giving the justification that neither the theory of demand nor the 
literature provided evidence of a functional form, a priori. The log- log functional form was, however, 
chosen because it consistently had higher coefficients. 
19 See footnote 16 for meaning of CIR 
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concurred with the findings of Caswell et al (1990), Howitt et al (1980), and Kim 
et al (1989), all of whom concluded that farmers generally switched to high value 
crops as water costs increase. 
The third finding, and which should not be confused with, or interpreted as 
contradicting the previous one, is that although farmers shifted to water - saving 
(hardy) crops with high value, this shift has less influence on agricultural water 
demand than the crop mix already existing in the three regions. In their own words 
"comparability between past elasticity estimates by crop and current estimates by 
region also suggest that farmers shift to water - saving crops have less influence on 
water demand than the crop mix existing within most regions. In other words, 
regions depend heavily on certain mixes of field crops which, themselves, haYe 
somewhat specialised water needs " (Clayton et al, 1989, Page 771). This is a 
unique finding, contrasting sharply with the other studies reviewed. They stress the 
point that although ,in general, farmers studied in the sample responded to higher 
water costs by switching to higher value crops, the effect of that switch on the 
water demand for the region as whole is limited. In other words, farmers do not go 
out of their way to introduce new high value crops that are exotic to the region but 
which could be as water - saving as they are valuable. Instead, they choose from 
the crop - mix or bundle which is characteristic to the region. This does not, 
however, contradict the finding that farmers respond by switching from low to high 
value crops. It only suggests that the search for the alternative is limited to the 
region specific crop mix. 
Fowthly, their results do indicate statistically significant differences in 
groundwater demand relationships associated with climate. The regions with lower 
irrigation water requirements had a more responsive demand for irrigation water 
than the rest of the west (Clayton et al, 1989, Page 771). However, in spite of 
differences in climate, crop mix and irrigation requirements ( as delineated by CIRs) 
across the three climatic regions, the relatively low elasticity of demand estimates 
for groundwater did not vary significantly across the climatic regions. This finding 
is in sharp contrast to the expectation that the dry areas in which water scarcity is 
more acute should be more responsive to water price. In an attempt to offer an 
explanation to this extraordinary finding, the authors state that "fixed well yields, 
large fixed investments in irrigation equipment, or the domination of a few crops 
may all reduce water price influences on water application per hectare" (Clayton et 
al, 1989, Page 771) . This point seems to lend credence to their contention that 
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even the shift to water - saving crops only has minimal effect on the overall water 
demand relative to the crop mix that pervades the region. 
2.11 Kim et al's Dynamic response model 
Kim et al (1989) developed and applied a dynamic model in the context of ground 
water mining for irrigated agriculture. The model hypothesises that there exists an 
inter - temporal depletion path with respect to ground water mining for irrigated 
agriculture. As a response to the depletion and the high cost of ground water 
mining, the model postulates that farmers respond in two ways: first, by re-
examining and adjusting the relative allocation of groundwater among the crops 
being irrigated, and, secondly, via endogenous switch points in time, a phenomenon 
that describes a systematic transition from production of crops with relatively low 
water demand. The model is empirically applied using information from the Texas 
High plains, which is part of the Ogallala aquifer in the western USA. In the 
context of this dissertation, the study is relevant in so far as it analyses farmer's 
allocative and water supply decisions in response to resource depletion and higher 
pumping costs i.e., higher water cost. 
The model is constructed not on the basis of the farmer's aggregate groundwater 
demand for irrigation but on the disaggregated categories, i.e. crop specific demand 
curves. 20 This allows for the inter - temporal relative allocation of water among 
categories of crops as a result of increases in water cost. Specifically, the 
agricultural demand for ground water is disaggregated into crop - specific linear 
demand curves with the objective of capturing the inter - temporal relative 
groundwater allocation among crops and the reduction in the number of crops that 
are cultivated under irrigation as a response to scarcity and higher groundwater 
mining cost. Given these objectives, the model posits a disaggregated, crop-specific 
inverse groundwater demand for the i th crop of the form below21: 
20 The decomposition I allocation of aggregate demand into the crop specific demands and pumping costs 
employed the Blaney-Criddle methodology the details of which are not presented but merely cited by the 
authors. Our search for this methodology was fruitless. 
21 Those interested in going through a rigorous mathematical development of the model can consult the 
reference directly. Attempting to do so here would be beyond the scope and purpose of this chapter. As 
such, only the equations relevant to the thrust of attention and the application of the model for Texas high 




P = _.!.. - - ·W, i = 1,2, ... ,n, 
b. b. I 
I I 
(52) 
W; = measurement of acre-feet of groundwater pumping for crop i; 
P = is the price (marginal extraction cost) in dollars per acre-foot 
ai and bi (> 0) are demand parameters estimated for crop i. 
The marginal pumping cost function, MC, is given by; 
where 
MC = k1 * (SL - h) = k2 * h (53) 
k1 = a positive constant representing pumping cost per acre-foot of lift; 
SL measures of irrigation surface level elevation above sea level; and, 
h measures the water table elevation in feet above sea level. 
The model introduces a groundwater hydrological equation under a multicrop water 
demand situation and which is specified as: 
n 
R + ( k3 - 1) L w; ( t) 
h = i= l (54) 
A.S 
where 
h = time derivative of h; 
R represents the average aquifer recharge rate in acre-feet per year; 
A= size of the aquifer in acres; and, 
S = a storativity coefficient. 
Total pumping costs is given by the following function with the terms as defined 
previously: 
n 
TC= L kl (SL-h)w; . (55) 
i - 1 
The region under study is characterised by the chronic 'mining' of groundwater. 
Irrigated agriculture accounts for a large proportion of all pumped groundwater in 
the region. The empirical application of the dynamic model uses economic and 
hydrologic parameters for the seven counties in there region of study. Producers in 
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this region largely rely on pumpmg groundwater for their irrigation water 
requirements. Ninety - five percent of irrigated acreage in the counties is planted in 
cotton and grain sorghum. (Kim et al, 1989, page 80) Two equations were 
estimated for cotton and sorghum water demands and include as independent 
variables real cotton prices ( dollars per pound), real sorghum prices ( dollars per 
bushel), real pumping cost ( dollars per acre-foot) , number of centre - pivot 
in·igation systems in the country, pre-plant rainfall, summer rainfall and six dummy 
variables to account for six of the seven counties included in the study. Prices were 
in 1967 dollars. Since the estimates involved pooled cross section - time series 
data, the demand equations were estimated using a model that assumed a first -
order autoregressive structure that takes account of the inherent problems of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
The two important conclusions were that short - run irrigation water demand 
decreases in cotton prices but increases in sorghum prices. In other words, a 
positive correlation existed between cotton water demand and its own price while 
the reverse was the case for sorghum prices. This conclusion implies that farmers 
respond to water scarcity signals, as represented by pumping costs, by not only 
reducing the water applied but also switching to higher value crops. The producer 
prices of both sorghum and cotton were significant, indicating that farmers in the 
High Plains take into account producer prices in making their irrigation water 
application decisions. The second conclusion is that both cotton and sorghum water 
demands ( despite the relatively high value of cotton relative to sorghum) decrease 
as pumping costs (the surrogate for water price) increases. 
2.12 Wade's (1990) " Corruption Model for Irrigation Water Pricing" 
The response of farmers to water scarcity signals have traditionally been estimated 
using prices of water. In a study of canal irrigation in Southern India, Wade (1990) 
provides an interesting, non -empirical case study of farmers response to water 
scarcity signals in a canal irrigation project as measured by the amount of bribery 
given to the irrigation engineers. Contextually, therefore, the price elasticity of 
demand for water could be viewed, then, as the 'bribe elasticity of demand' for 
irrigation water. He documents that the actual area of land available or under 
irrigation is a function of the size of the bribe the irrigation engineers demand. This 
was especially the case for those farms in th~ southern parts of India where vast 
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areas of land are being inigated despite its illegality. In the context of this 
dissertation, the 'bribe price', an inigation water scarcity signal, not only determines 
the total area of land brought under iITigation but is also one of the key issues in 
the present paper i.e., crop choice. This is perhaps more evident from the quote 
below: 
"A second reason why irrigators may approach Irrigation engineers has to do with 
the zoning of land for irrigation. Very large areas of land under most South 
Indian canals - often running into tens of thousands of acres per canal - are being 
irrigated (sic) anauthorisedly, in the sense that they are not entitled by crop zoning 
arrangements to any irrigation at all, or are intended for non-paddy but are 
growing (water intensive) paddy crops." (Wade, P. 296).22 
2.13 Conclusion 
The literature reviewed thus far demonstrates that a wide variety of models have 
been used to investigate a large number of issues relating to water use in iITigated 
agriculture. Amongst the issues investigated were farmers' response to water prices 
in terms of amount of water used; their decisions regarding land allocation per 
crop; the effect of iITigation water prices on choice of crops to cultivate under 
iITigation; choice of technology; and output response to iITigation water application. 
Whereas all these issues are relevant for those interested in the economics of 
iITigated agriculture, we shall focus here on short - run iITigation water demand, 
crop choice, technology choice and crop output response to irrigation water use in 
a specific region(s) of South Africa. It is clear from the varied results contained in 
these surveys that no a priori evidence exists to indicate what the likely situation 
would be in South Africa. This is left for empirical enquiry and is the subject of 
Chapter 4. The works of Just et al (1990a) and 1990(b) offer an additional insight; 
viz that the results are quite responsive to the model specification and functional 
forms adopted. This is also the conclusion one draws from Moore C.V (1990) and 
Martin et al ( 1982), both of which are not reviewed in detail in this dissertation. It 
is also clear that most of the literature concurs with regard to the propensity of 
farmers to shift to higher valued crops in response to water prices, even though the 
authors differ widely with regard to the price elasticity of demand for iITigation 
water. 
22 In this southern Indian state studied, paddy (unhasked rice) is the main irrigated crop while 
groundnuts, hybrid sorghum and cotton are irrigated crops. If the 'bribe price' is reasonable, irrigators 
(farmers) may as well cultivate cotton under irrigation as opposed to paddy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF MULTIPLE PRODUCT FIRM THEORY AND 
MODEL FORMULATION 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with a review of the theory of the multi - product firm which 
forms the theoretical base of this dissertation. We then adapt it to farm firms' 
choice of crops and input utilisation decisions. In section 3 .4, the four equations 
that are empirically estimated in Chapter 5 are modelled and the variables 
explained. Section 3.5 describes the data and study area. 
3.2 The theory of Multi - product Firm 
This section briefly reviews the theory of the multi - product finn as it forms the 
theoretical basis for the dissertation and the econometric model specified and 
estimated below, and analysed subsequently in later chapters. It offers, then, a 
theoretical basis for the subject of this dissertation. The first parts of this section 
offer a textual and diagrammatic explanation of the multi - product firm theory 
which are then presented more formally towards the end of this chapter. 
The theory of the multi - product firm is an extension of the more conventional 
text - book presentation of the single output product firm. Firms combine factors 
of production to produce various forms of output or products, given an existing 
technology23 . Whereas it is true that goals of firms differ and are varied, the profit 
maximising motive has traditionally been accepted to approximate the objective of 
most fmns. 24 Since fmns have to combine factors of production (inputs) and 
transform these into outputs, they inevitably and obviously have to incur costs. 
The fmn's objective may thus be revised as maximising profits subject to various 
cost constraints. Whereas costs need not be the only constraints, ( e.g. others such 
as technological ones often do exist) we will assume away the existence of such 
constraints for the present purpose so as to focus on cost constraints alone. 
23 It is assumed that technology is fixed in both the short and the long run such that it is only in the 
very long run that technology is to be varied with respect to output. 
24 The classical assumption that firms are driven by profit maximisation as their prime motive has been 
the subject of lively debate amongst economies. In the process, alternative theories have been put forward, 
such as maximisation of sales or even managerial benefits as per agency theory. While there are elements 
of 'truth' in these varied assumptions, this paper adopts the Neo-classical view without attempting to 
dismiss the validity of alternate thought. 
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A two - product, two - input firm framework can be used to explain the theory of 
the multi - product firm. This analysis can, however, be easily extended to firms 
producing more than two products and employing a larger number of inputs. 
Assuming the two -product, two - input scenario holds for purposes of illustration, 
a farm firm (henceforth farm) produces each crop (product) x and y by combining 
two factors L and K. The farm thus chooses various combinations of inputs for 




This can also be demonstrated diagramatically. The vanous combinations of 
inputs that yield different levels of outputs are best illustrated using an Edgeworth 
box whose sides measure the total available levels of each input on either axis, as 
illustrated in Figure 1 below (Koutsoiyannis, 1985). Any point within the 
Edgeworth box gives combinations of x and y produced by the available factors of 
production. If we let the production function for commodity x be represented by 
the set of isoquants labelled A, which are convex to the origin Ox, while the 
isoquants labelled B, and which are convex to origin Oy, represent the production 
function of commodity y, then it is evident that the further away isoquant B lies 
from its origin Oy, the greater the quantity of commodity y that the firm is 
producing. A similar explanation can obviously be extended to those isoquants 
labelled A. The firm's decision is that of where to produce within the Edgeworth 
box. For efficient production and profit maximisation, it is obvious that the firm 
will produce along the contract curve, OxOy , derived by joining the several points 
of tangency of isoquants A and B. This is due to the fact that while any point of 
production outside the contract curve, such as point N is feasible, it is not efficient 
(i.e. Pareto Optimal) because the firm can reallocate resources to the production of 
one or both products by producing somewhere along the contract curve, such 
points as M and P. The actual point of production along the contract curve, is 






From Figure 1, above, the line OxOy is the Edgeworth contract curve. The choice 
of levels of inputs A and B that the firm will employ in producing x and y can be 
derived from the Edgeworth illustration by using the production possibility ( or 
product transformation) curve of the firm. The PPC gives the locus of points of x 
and y that consume all the firm's resources. However, the PPC itself is nothing 
more than the contract curve derived from the Edgeworth box framework for each 
point of tangency between the isoquants and defines a combination of output 




3.3 Formal derivation of the Production Possibility Curve 
Since an isoquant measures the combination of inputs A and B that produce a 
specific level of a product, x, the slope of any of the isoquants measures the 
marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) of the inputs Kand L ~ thus 
OX 
MRTSx = MPL,x =n_ ___ o_K 




where MRTS t.K is the marginal rate of technical substitution of factors K and L in 
the production of commodity x. This can be extended to the production possibility 
curve B for product y, viz: 
M'RT.'S 
y _ MP L,y __ oK 
L.K- MP - aL K,y 
(57) 
At the points of tangency between the two series of isoquants A and B, i.e. on the 
contract curve, the slopes must be equal implying that 
OK _ MPL,x _ MPL,y _ OK 
- oL - MPK,x - MPK,y - - aL (58) 
Likewise the slope of the production possibility curve for the firm is given by 
oy 
--=MRPTxy OX ) 
where MRPT x,y is the marginal rate of product transformation. 
(59) 
Movement along the production possibility curve from the y axis towards x means, 
essentially, that inputs are released to the production of x which then experiences a 
corresponding gain in inputs. These two conditions can formally be represented 
respectively as 
oLy(MPL.y )+oKy(MPK.y)= oy 
(60) 
Totally differentiating the production possibility curve, i.e. its slope, yields 
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oy _ oLy(MPL.y) + oKy(MP K.y ) 
- OX - oLx(MPL,x) + oKx(MP K,x) (61) 
An important condition for efficient production is that the firm must 'produce on' 
the curve and not inside it. Moreover, since the slopes of isoquants A and B are 
equal at tangency then 
- MPL,y) 




Dividing the total differential by o Ly(= -oLx) yields 
O MPL,y +MPx.i~1Y) 
y - y 
- Ox - MPL,x-MP K.xe~1x) 
y 
(64) 
Substituting (62) and (63) into (61) gives 
MPL oK 
MP ( ,x + ____L) 
oy _ k,y MP K,x oLy 
- ox MPLy oK 
-MP K,xCMP ' + oLx) 
K,y y 
(65) 
However, since the terms in the brackets are equal by definition and the second 
bracketed terms are equal by the condition oKy = oKx , then the bracketed 
functions fall away and are cancelled out; thus, the slope of the production 
possibility curve is given by 
oy _ MPL.y _ MPK.y 
- Ox - MPL ,x - MPK ,x 
(66) 
The optimal combination of the quantities of y and x, is that combination the sales 
from which yield the same revenue to the firm, i.e., the isorevenue condition. This 
can be obtained from the equation 
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-
R= Px.(x) + Px .(Y) 
And, solving for y yields 
R Py 




Given product prices ( and agricultural produce prices are often given as an 
example of products closely approximating the competitive firm's price - taking 
behaviour in the absence of statutory boards) the values of R can be derived by 
assuming different values of x. 
The formal elaboration of the multi - product firm's equilibrium condition 
described above may be re-stated as follows: firms seeks to maximise profits 
subject to the constraints set by the factors of production, the transformation curve, 
the prices of the commodities (Px, Py ) and the factors of production (w,r). In the 
context of the subject matter of this dissertation, rational farmers are expected to 
choose output and input combination that make profit maximisation tenable. As 
such, rationality dictates that farmers will choose crops with high per hectare 
returns, minimise on input usage (such as that of water), choose irrigation 
technologies that minimise costs and maximise profits and apply inputs up to a 
point where their marginal revenue products equals the marginal cost of the 
additional unit of the input applied. These four concerns form the essence of our 
empirical analysis and correspond to the crop choice, short run water use, 
technology choice and crop output equations formulated in the next section and 
which are estimated in Chapter Four. 
3.4 Model Specification, Variable Selection and Justification 
This section delineates the equations that will be empirically estimated in the 
following chapter using the multi - product firm theory discussed above and the 
literature on water input usage and models reviewed in Chapter Two. Using the 
multi - product firm framework and the models reviewed earlier, we construct four 
equations which are subsequently estimated in Chapter Four. The first is a crop 
choice equation that will be empirically estimated in an attempt to test whether 
farm firms are guided by relative product (crop) values per hectare in their choice 
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of crops cultivated. The second equation is the short run irrigation water 
demand equation. In the context of the multi - product finn model and given our 
expectation that fann firms will use input combinations up to a point where their 
marginal product per unit costs are equated, it is desirable to test whether water 
input use by fanners is responsive to its cost. Thirdly, we formulate a technology 
choice equation which builds on the theoretical premise of the second equation. 
The argument is that farm finns that respond to input scarcity signals (water costs 
or prices) are more likely to respond by using water-saving technologies. The 
fourth and last equation is conveniently referred to as the output equation. This 
equation seeks to capture yield or output response to water and other variable 
inputs applied in the production process. 
3.4.1 Crop Choice equation 
The crop choice equation is modelled as a variant of the multicrop inputs 
allocation model used by Moore, Gollehon and Carey (1992), herein after MGC, 
for the W estem regions of the USA. It should be noted that the variations from the 
MGC model have been necessitated by data constraints and the need to remain as 
theoretically and practically relevant to South African conditions as possible. We 
formulate the crop choice equation as follows; 
where 
di = fi (p, g, w, I, r) i = 1, .. , m (69) 
di is a discrete choice variable equal to 1 if crop of profitability class i is 
grown and zero otherwise; 
p are normalised crop prices; 
g is the per hectare profit margin for each crop i ; 
w is amount of water applied per hectare 
I is the labour input requirement per hectare for each i; and 
r is a measure of other variable input requirements other than water; 
Perhaps the most significant modification to the MGC model is the fact that the 
dependent variable in our case does not consist of the four dummy variables 
representing the five crops as used in their study. Instead, we have classified the 
crops in the sample into t:vo categories depending on whether they fall above or 
below the mean of their reported per hectare value. The plausibility of this 
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transformation is not difficult to understand. From the perspective of the 
multicrop firm model, we are simply substituting specific crop classification with a 
profitability level classification. In terms of econometric considerations, it is not 
the inclusion of specific product types that matters, but whether there exist 
variations in profitability associated with a particular line of production. This 
transformation does not violate that requirement. Another motivation for the 
transformation has to do with data availability and the form in which it is 
presented. As will be noted later on in the description of the data, the combud25 
data set provides information relating to fifteen crop types. Attempting to include 
all of them would create problems with sample size and degrees of freedom in our 
subsequent estimation. 
The inclusion of price as an explanatory variable in the crop choice equation may 
be justified on the premise that farm firms normally respond to price signals in 
their choice of crops to cultivate. Consequently, to the extent that higher crop 
prices determine farm profitability and influence crop choice, the variable clearly 
belongs in the model. It is hypothesised that crop choice, as defined previously, is 
positively related to individual crop price. This is in conformity with theory as 
well as the econometric specification adopted here, where the higher - value crops 
take the value 1 in the dummy variable formulation while lower valued crops take 
zero. If the specification were reversed, we would expect a negative correlation. 
The variable g is included as a measure of profitability amongst the specific crops 
in the sample. While high crop prices can be seen as a necessary condition for 
farm profitability and an attraction for farmers, it is not a sufficient condition for 
farm profitability since this depends on the per hectare crop output, crop prices 
and the other variable costs of production. Certain crops have higher prices per ton 
but lower gross margins owing to the fact that their production costs are higher. 
This is a strong justification for including the variable in the crop choice equation. 
We hypothesis, a priori , a positive correlation between crop choice and gross 
margin per hectare. 
25 The data set, combud, is annual farm budget statistics gathered by the Directorate of Agricultural 
Economic for short term planning purposes. Details of this data presented in Chapter 4. 
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The variable w is the amount of irrigation water applied per hectare. For crops 
grown under irrigation, water becomes an important input not only for agronomic 
considerations but also for the expectation that expenditures on irrigation water not 
only necessarily form a high proportion of pre-harvest costs, but also importantly 
determine the gross margin per hectare. It is therefore postulated that rationality 
will dictate that farmers will, ceteris paribus, choose those crops with low 
irrigation water requirements in lieu of those that require higher irrigation water 
application rates for a given technology. Plant water requirement is, itself, a 
function of peculiar agronomic considerations and will thus vary by crop, length of 
growing season, climate and similar variables. Delving into such considerations 
are, however, neither relevant to, nor within the scope of, this equation. We 
therefore expect a priori that the correlation between the per hectare water 
requirement I application and crop choice to be is negative. 
Labour is an important factor in agricultural production. Just as with water 
requirements, labour requirements vary from one crop to the next. The amount of 
labour that a farm hires depends on the type of crop, and the ease and desirability 
of factor substitution between labour and capital, i.e. the desirability and ease with 
which labour can be substituted by machinery. Available literature suggests that 
South African agriculture is over - mechanised and this is frequently attributed to 
two factors: first is the rise in farm wages, a factor that has made labour expensive 
relative to machinery; second is the fear of a potentially negative impact on 
agricultural production as a result of hostile agricultural labour relations during the 
apartheid regime a part from other reasons such as the concessionary terms at 
which machinery was availed to the farmers and the short period within which 
such machinery were 'written - off for tax purposes. The inclusion of the labour 
variable, /, in the equation is thus justified. We expect crop choice to be 
negatively correlated with the labour input per hectare. 
The last variable in the equation, r, is a measure of the per hectare requirement for 
other inputs in crop production. In the farming sector, generally, farmers use 
operating capital in the purchase of complimentary inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, 
herbicides and other chemicals that help raise healthy plants and therefore enhance 
output. How much the farmer spends in purchasing these inputs will influence his 
overall production costs and, thus, the farm. margins. Given that profit-maximising 
firm farms are to be guided by rational decision - making, one way a farmer can 
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influence his gross margin is to choose crops that are non-intensive in the use of 
inputs ( e.g. crops that have less water requirement) and which are, therefore, less 
demanding in te1ms of their per hectare operating capital requirements. In the 
combud data set used in this dissertation, we have used interest payments on funds 
borrowed from credit institutions as a proportion of operating capital as a proxy 
for the relative per hectare operating capital requirement for each observation in 
the sample. We anticipate a priori a negative correlation between the dependent 
variable and this proxy for operating capital requirements which are used in the 
purchase of farm inputs. 
3.4.2 Water demand equation 
The short run irrigation water demand may be written as follows; 
where 
i = 1, .. , m 
wi is the per hectare quantity of water applied in farm i ; 
Pi is the price of crop cultivated by farm i ; 
pci is the per hectare irrigation power cost; 
gmi is the per hectare gross margin on farm i; 
fcosti is the per hectare fixed cost; 
Ti is a discrete choice for the technology applied in farm i ; 
(70) 
lgsi is the length of crop growing season in months for the crop in farm i ; 
and 
ri is the interest payment on operating capital by farm i 
The combud data set records the amount of irrigation water, in cubic metres, 
applied per hectare for each of the observations in the sample. As explained in 
more detail in section 3.4.4 regarding the data used here, only observations that 
report the use of irrigation technologies and the actual amount irrigation water 
applied and irrigation power costs were recorded have been included in our 
analysis. This leads to the exclusion of all observations that reported using flood 
irrigation techniques since, in such cases, water price is exogenously determined 
(i.e. set by the water authorities or irrigation board) and invariant with respect to 
volumes used. On the other hand, those farms that report using sprinkler and 
centre pivot schemes had to undertake their own pumping and pressurising of 
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water flow and thus energy, or power, cost represents a close proxy for the actual 
water price. 
The variable pc refers to the costs incurred per hectare for power cost used in 
pumping and pressurising water flow for irrigation purposes. Both the centre pivot 
and sprinkler systems involve power costs which provide a good proxy for water 
prices. The amount spent varies with the type of motors and engines installed, the 
water-saving attributes of the technology adopted, as well as the intensity of 
irrigation envisaged among other considerations. Like all costs, we expect the unit 
power cost variable to be negatively correlated with per hectare water use. 
Gross margin, gm, is included in our equation as one of the independent variables 
as a measure of profitability. It is postulated that the higher is the gross margin for 
a particular farm activity, the greater the probability that the farm will be in a 
position to adequately cover those costs involved in pumping and pressurising 
irrigation water. Such farms are thus expected to be less constrained in their 
application of water given optimal crop water requirements, prevailing climatic 
conditions and particular soil characteristics. We therefore expect a positive 
correlation between the amount of water used and the farm's per hectare gross 
margm. 
The variable feast is the irrigation fixed costs per hectare. This includes the sunk 
costs of investment in irrigation equipment and irrigation-related farm structures. 
The extent of fixed cost varies across farms, irrigation technologies and crop types. 
It is postulated that those farms with heavy investments in irrigation equipment 
and machinery will be less responsive to the variable pumping or energy costs 
involved in putting such equipment into use. The correlation between the amount 
of water applied and the magnitude of fixed investments per hectare is thus 
expected to be positive. Therefore, farmers who have the fmancial resources to put 
into place expensive irrigation systems are less likely to be constrained in the 
amount of water they apply. 
The type of technology used in applying water to the crop root system is included 
as an explanatory variable in the water demand equation. Irrigation technologies 
are diverse with respect to their efficiencies, where efficiency is defmed to refer to 
the difference between the irrigation water that is pumped and which actually 
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reaches the crop root system. Flood irrigation techniques are obviously less 
efficient in this regard than are either sprinkler or centre pivot system. It is 
assumed that irrigation water use per hectare is inversely related to the efficiency 
of the particular irrigation technology. Since there are only two techniques 
inquired of in this study, the impact of irrigation technology in the short run 
irrigation water demand equation is modelled using a dummy variable, taking the 
value 1 if sprinkler technology is employed and zero otherwise. The sign of the 
coefficient is indeterminate since there is no a priori evidence that sprinkler 
irrigation is more efficient than centre pivot irrigation technique or conversely. 
The length of a crop's growing season, /gs, is included as an explanatory variable 
in our short-run water demand equation as it determines the length of crop-
irrigation-days for a particular crop. For example, whereas vegetables take a short 
period to maturity ( often about three months), maize and cotton may take longer 
while yet others like Lucerne may have to be irrigated most of the year. The 
com bud data gives the length of the growing season (in months) when irrigation 
water was actually applied. We postulate that crops or farm firms that produce 
crops with longer periods irrigation water requirements will use more water than 
will those that take relatively shorter periods from sowing to harvesting. The 
coefficient of the variable /gs is thus expected to be positive. 
The last variable included in the equation is interest payments on working capital 
as a proportion of pre-harvest costs, r. Farm inputs are normally purchased from 
the farm firm's working capital and the extent to which interest payments on 
working capital forms a high proportion of the total pre-harvest costs indicate that 
particular farm's ability to meet its input cost obligations, including paying for 
energy needed to pump and pressurise water for irrigation. Given this, we would 
thus expect a negative correlation between irrigation water application and the 
level of a farm's operating capital indebtedness as represented by the proportion of 
interest payments to the total pre-harvest costs. On the other hand, one could 
argue convincingly that those farms that are heavily reliant on borrowed working 
capital have no constraints in their supply of inputs (including water) since such 
borrowed working capital often provides the fa1mers the finances with which input 
purchases are made. In fact farmers who are heavily reliant on borrowed working 
capital in a particular crop season are more pressed financially and are, therefore, 
often more likely to make sure that they apply all required inputs that would 
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maximise per hectare output since that would ensure a larger gross farm income 
and an enhanced ability to meet debt obligations. Given this scenario, therefore, 
one would expect a positive relationship between the amount of irrigation water 
applied and the level of the farms' operating capital indebtedness. We, therefore, 
have no a priori expectation about the sign of the coefficient of the variable r. 
3.4.3 Technology Choice Equation 
The type of irrigation technology adopted by the farmer has ramifications for 
irrigation water use as irrigation technologies differ with respect to their water-
saving attributes, i.e. irrigation efficiency. Drip irrigation is, for example, more 
efficient than is flood irrigation as the latter loses more irrigation water applied per 
hectare in run-off, percolation and evaporation. Likewise centre pivot irrigation 
technology and sprinkler irrigation do not have the same levels of efficiency. 
Profit maximisation thus envisions that rational farmers will choose irrigation 
techniques after taking due cognisance of their relative irrigation water-saving 
efficiencies. Since all observations included in the sample either have sprinkler or 
centre pivot schemes, it is desirable to investigate whether water-saving 
considerations do play any role in irrigation technology choice by farmers. Perhaps 
the following quote from a study of the history of irrigation technology adoption 
in the western USA provides insight as to the importance of technology choice for 
cost minimisation in irrigated agricultural production. 
"The centre pivot system became extremely popular, probably because it required 
only one fourth the amount of labour that a furrow or a hand moved system needed. 
The centre pivot has several other advantages over conventional furrow systems 
because it can be used on a hillier land and sandier soil with higher application 
efficiency.26 One draw back of the centre pivot system was its relatively high energy 
requirements... the total energy cost of a gravity distribution system with a 50% 
application efficiency exceeds that of a centre pivot system with an 80% application 
efficiency for pumping depths of 250 feet or more. Thus, centre pivot were more 
likely to be water-saving rather than energy saving." (Nieswiadomy, 1988, 
Page 64) 
26 Application efficiency is defined as the ratio of the amount of water that is retained in the root zone 
divided by the amount of water delivered to the soil surface. 
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This observation seems to fit well the South African situation where the centre 
pivot technology is more energy-intensive in operation, but relatively labour -
saving as compared to the sprinkler irrigation technique. This is evident from 
Table 3.1, below, which gives descriptive statistics for energy use, labour and 
machine hours per hectare for the sprinkler and centre pivot technologies included 
in the sample. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Power Kwhr Machine Hrs Labour Hrs 
Sprinkler Pivot Sprinkler Pivot Sprinkler Pivot 
Mean 2.6 338 96.8 62 99.7 40 
Median 0.7 0.7 83 45 57 28 
Minimum 0.5 0.14 37 18.3 4 10.1 
Maximum 35 10461 312 392 420 340 
St. Deviation 1.2 337 9.9 12 18 10 
Source : Computed from combud data set 
That South African irrigators have been moving rapidly towards more efficient, 
lower cost irrigation technologies is further clearly indicated by Figure 3.1, below, 
which illustrates that there has been a decided switch from flood, to the relatively 











Figure 3.1 : Trend in Irrigation Technology Adoption 
Lola] area 
sprinkler 
--- --- ......... 
--- fl ood 
drip / micro j 
19 0 19 0 19 0 199 200 
Source : Macdonalds I.AW (1988) 
Irrigation technology choice may thus be modelled as: 
27 
di = fi (p, g, w, /, r, R) i = 1, .. , m (71) 
where 
di is a discrete choice variable equal to 1 if sprinkler technology and zero 
otherwise· 27 
' 
p = crop pnces; 
g is the per hectare profit margin for each i; 
w is the per hectare water application for each i; 
For purposes of this dissertation, the choice is restricted to either sprinkler or centre pivot. This has 
been necessitated by data constraints i.e. the combud data set contained information based largely on these 
two. This is not insinuate that they are the only two technology options adopted by farmers in the two 
regions. 
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l is the labour input requirement per hectare for each i; 
f is the per hectare irrigation fixed cost for each i; 
R is a dummy that captures climatic and topographical differences 
between the two regions described in section 3.4.5 dealing with data set and 
the study area. 
It is evident, then, that the technology choice equation may be modelled as a 
discrete choice equation where the dependent variable takes the value 1 if 
sprinkler technology is in use, and zero if it is a centre pivot type. The data used 
in this dissertation contain nearly equal observations that use either system. Our a 
priori expectation is that the coefficient of water cost, is negatively correlated to 
the independent variable while f l, and g have a positive correlation with the 
dependent variable. We have no a priori indication of the signs of the coefficients 
of the crop prices, p, and the regional dummy, R. 
3.4.4 Crop Output equation 
The crop output equation is modelled as: 
Qi =Ji (p, W, [, e, C, ) i = 1, .. , m 
where 
Qi is normalised per hectare crop output.; 
. . 
p 1s crop pnces; 
w is the per hectare water application ; 
I is the labour input employed per hectare; 
e is the per hectare energy utilisation; 
c is the per hectare preharvest costs for inputs other than water and 
energy 
(71) 
The crop output model is specified as dependent on the amount of irrigation 
water, w, applied. The theoretical justification for including this variable in the 
model is that where water is a constraint in agricultural production, its application 
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to crops via either irrigation method should result in higher output. We thus 
expect a positive relationship between the amount of water applied and the output 
that the farmer actually harvests. 
The amount of labour hours used per hectare, /, has been included in the model as 
it is an important input in crop production. This variable captures the actual 
labour input, i.e. the number of labour hours actually employed in the production 
process per hectare. Labour is required promptly at critical stages of plant growth 
such as sowing, weeding, harvesting and harvesting, among other chores. Farms 
with inadequate, or less than optimal, labour inputs are expected to have lower 
productivity and hence lower output. We therefore expect a positive relationship 
between output per hectare and the amount of irrigation labour hours employed 
per hectare. 
The variable, c, denotes total pre-harvest costs. Pre-harvest costs are defined to 
include the per hectare expenditures on chemicals, fertilisers and herbicides which 
the farmer uses in crop production. Farmers who apply fertilisers and chemicals 
as recommended are likely to have higher pre-harvest costs but also greater output 
than those farms that ignore, or use fewer of such inputs and in less than the 
quantities recommended. We therefore anticipate a positive relationship between 
output and the per hectare pre-harvest expenses. 
The variable, e, refers to the amount of kilowatt hours used per hectare. All farm 
enterprises in the sample used electricity for their pumping and pressure 
requirements. The higher the pumping requirements for the particular crop, the 
more pumping hours and hence energy used. To the extent that this variable 
reflects irrigation intensity, we expect a positive correlation between output and 
energy as defined above. Interest payments are included in the model as proxies 
for cost of operating capital. Different farm crops have different operating capital 
requirements. The Combud data set used in this analysis gives interest payments 
on operating capital borrowed by farmers for the crop season. Higher interest 
payments effectively reduces farm profitability as reflected in the gross margin and 
therefore reduces farmers' ability to employ other inputs which are required. The 
propensity of the farmer to reduce his costs compromises the optimal or desirable 
input application and with it, crop output. To the extent that this is true, we expect 
a negative correlation between output and interest payments. 
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The last variable in the model, p, refers to normalised crop price per ton. The 
theoretical justification for including this variable is that output prices determine 
the gross margin per hectare. For the same input costs, farms that produce high 
value (price) crops will, by definition, have higher gross margins. The point is, to 
the extent that prices determine gross margins, farmers experiencing higher gross 
margins are more likely to spend on inputs and techniques that enhance 
productivity and are therefore likely to have higher output than ·their counterparts. 
We therefore expect a positive correlation between output and crop prices. 
3.4.S Data and Study area 
The data used in this analysis comes from annual farm budget series, combud, for 
the year 1994. The series is published annually by the Directorate of Agricultural 
Economics largely in the form of income and cost budgets for use as short term 
planning aids. Even though the Annual Reports referred to above only contain 
summarised information and tables, the raw data collected and updated annually is 
available on-line in the Department's computer system. While compiling the 
statistics, the Department brings together 2 or 3 farmers who successfully follow 
acceptable management practices in a specific area, for a particular crop, and who 
provide information relating to various output and input variables. The data is 
collected by experienced extension staff and are believed to be reasonably 
accurate.28 Even though the combud data set contains 941 farm budgets, the focus 
of the present dissertation meant that only those farm budgets that contained 
information on at least one form of irrigation could be used in our analysis. This 
was again "filtered" so that only those entries from either the Transvaal or Orange 
Free State were included. The rationale for doing so is that other regions of the 
country either had adequate rainfall, e.g. winter rainfall areas, or were not as 
important in terms of agriculture. Yet, others such as those in Natal and the 
Eastern Cape, were excluded not only on the grounds that they had few 
observations but, more importantly, because of the desire to have a better defined 
and focused analysis. Including a wide region with perversely diverse 
topographical, climatic and management practices would risk having blunt and non 
28 One very helpful officer boasted during our visit to their offices that if the information were not 
accurate, commercial Banlcs and other lending institutions wouldn't be using them in assessing fixed and 
operating loan applications by farmers. 
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focused results. Even though our desire would have been to focus on a much 
smaller area within either region, doing so would have resulted in insufficient 
degrees of freedom in the empirical analysis undertaken in the next chapter. The 
data set was, accordingly, narrowed down to 63 observations, with each region 
contributing roughly one half of the total observations. 
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CHAPTER 4 




In the previous chapter, we developed the foundation for the empirical estimation 
of the four equations for crop choice, short - run irrigation water demand, 
technology choice and crop output. In this chapter, those equations are estimated 
and analysed. Section 4.2 discusses the crop choice equation while the water 
demand, technology choice and crop output equations are dealt with in sections 
4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 respectively. All the regression equations were estimated using 
the Windows version of TSP i.e. Eviews. Since the equations' formulation has 
been discussed and the economic criteria for the selection of variables explained, 
this chapter will focus exclusively on the interpretation and analysis of the results. 
It is important to note that, while the short - run water demand and crop output 
equations have been estimated using an ordinary least square (OLS) estimation 
procedure the crop choice and technology choice equations have been e·stimated 
using the Logit model. This has been necessitated by the econometric 
consideration that the latter set of equations have discrete dependent variables. 
The Logit procedure, based on the cumulative logistic probability function, 
describes the logarithm of the odds that either choice (i.e. of the discrete 
dependent variables) will be made, given a set of independent variables. Using 
OLS procedure under such circumstances is tantamount to subjecting the equation 
to a linear probability function where the slope of the regression line, in effect, 
would measure the effect on the probability of making either choice of a unit 
change in either one of the independent variables, while holding all others 
constant. Since some of the right - hand side variables in the two equations are, 
themselves, qualitative the use of Logit model in such circumstances is 
econometrically superior to OLS. The specific difficulty with the linear 
probability model is that the error terms are inherently heteroscedastic and are not 
normally distributed even though these problems do not cause a bias. The greatest 
problem with the probabilistic linear model is, however, that the expected value of 
the dependent variable (a dummy variable) is not limited to 1 or 0. One thus often 
gets expected value estimates that are outside the requisite probability range. Such 
an estimate does not make statistical sense and is therefore intuitively 
unappealing. 29 
29 For a thorough treatment of qualitative variables, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld chapter, 10. Whereas the 
use of ordinary least squares under the circumstances has certain statistical drawbacks, the relative ease of 
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4.2 Crop Choice Equation 
The formulation of the crop choice model was described in Chapter Three and 
need not be repeated here. The equation to be estimated is: 
Hvcrop = /J1Price -/32 Water+ /JJGmargin - /34Lhours - /35Propint + ei (72) 
The variables are as previously defined and ei is an independent, normally 
distributed error term. The regression results of the logit model are presented in 
Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1 : Regression output for crop choice equation 
LOGJT II Dependent Variable is Hvcrop 
Date 08105195 
Sample: 1 63 
Included observations: 63 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations 
Variable Coefficien Std. Error T-Statistic 
t 
c -7.054652 3.507477 -2.011318 
Price -1.110556 0.831507 -1.335595 
Water -4.989315 4.053366 -1.230906 
Gmargin 10.87124 4.483536 2.424701 
Lhours 0.176830 0.507306 0.348566 
Pro pint 1.199074 14.18843 0.084095 
Log likelihood -5.43 
Obs with Dep= 1 15 








The regression results presented above have the "correct" signs, as previously 
hypothesised . The most significant single result from t]:ie above regression output 
is that the coefficient of the per hectare water application variable is statistically 
interpreting its coefficients and related statistics is one reason why most researchers assume such 
difficulties away. 
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insignificant. This importantly implies that the relative per hectare irrigation water 
application requirement among crops does not influence farmers' crop choice 
decision. It is also apparent from these results that the per unit crop price, the per 
hectare labour hours and the working capital requirement proxy variable (propint) 
seem not to feature or are not important considerations in crop choice as reflected 
by their statistically insignificant coefficients. Thus, the only important variable in 
explaining crop choice is the per hectare gross margin as reflected by the statistical 
significance of the gmargin coefficient. 
For qualitative choice models, such as the equation estimated above, an overall 
measure of goodness-of-fit such as the R2 in the OLS estimates is not readily 
available from regression outputs of most statistical packages. 30 Instead, the 
likelihood ratio index is adopted as an alternative measure of goodness-of-fit. The 
index is normally specified as : 
p = 1 - L(/!) 
L(O) 
Note that the denominator of the right hand side is the restricted model while the 
numerator is the unrestricted model. The statistic computed above falls in the O to 
I range and thus offers an alternative to the normal R2. It is worth noting that pis 
difficult to interpret in the same sense that one does R 2. It however gives an 
indication of the overall performance of the coefficients in explaining the model. 
An alternative to the above is the more familiar likelihood ratio test which can be 
used to test the hypothesis that either one, a group or all the coefficients in a 
particular equation are zero. The Likelihood ratio test is normally specified as: 
30 It is possible, however, to generate 'Pseudo R2' using packages like LIMDEP and STATA. These, 
hoewere, were not immediately available for such statistics to be generated. 
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where 
m is the number of restrictions; 
L(/JR) is the log likelihood estimate of the restricted equation; and 
L(/JUR) is the log likelihood estimate of the unrestricted equation. 
Since the Log - likelihood ratio index and the associated ratio test involve 
estimating both the log - likelihood of the unrestricted model, as presented in 
Table 4.1 and a restricted model3 1, we implement the restriction by omitting all the 
right hand side variables in the unrestricted equation. The log likelihood estimate 
for the unrestricted model is -34.6. Substituting these log - likelihood estimates 
from the unrestricted and the restricted equations into the likelihood ratio index 
formular presented previously yields: 
p = 1 - L({J) = 1- - 5.43 = 0.84 
L(O) -34.6 
As mentioned earlier, the above value is a pseudo R2 but may not be interpreted in 
the same manner one does normal R 2. It however gives an indication of the 
explanatory power of the explanatory variables. 
Further, an estimation of the likelihood ratio test as previously explained is 
necessary. The goal of this procedure (likelihood ratio test) is to allow testing of 
the hypothesis that the coefficients of the right hand side variables are zero. 
Again, using the log-likelihood estimates and substituting these values into the 
likelihood test formula yields: 
-2(-5.4 - 34.6)] -40 
Since the chi square statistic computed above is greater than the critical value of 
chi square with five degrees of freedom at 5 per cent significance level ( 11. 07) we 
can reject the null hypothesis that the restrictions do not apply implying that the 
coefficients are not equal to zero. This implies that the variables are included in 
the equation are important explaining crop choice as formulated in the model. 
31 This figure is estimated using Logit with the four restrictions. The coefficients and other regression 
statistics are however not reproduced. 
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4.3 Short - run Water demand equation 
The short - run irrigation water demand equation, as noted in the previous chapter, 
can be functionally expressed as follows: 
Lwateri = XI + X2 Lpowercoi - X3 Lpricei + X4 Lfcosti + X5 Techi 
+ X6 Gmonthsi + X7 Lpropinti + ei ( 73) 
where the variables are as specified in Chapter Three and ei is an independent, 
normally distributed error term with zero mean. The short - run irrigation water 
demand equation as formulated above was estimated in log - log form using OLS 
estimation procedure. This formulation allows the coefficients to be interpreted as 
elasticities. The regression output is presented in Table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2 : water demand equation's regression output 
LS// Dependent Variable is LWATER 
Date: 08/14/95 
Sample: 1 63 
Included observations: 63 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob. 
c 4.778833 0.516677 9.249162 0.0000 
Lpowerco -0.046344 0.028176 -1.644845 0.1057 
Lprice -0.072592 0.045053 -1.611254 0.1128 
Lfcost 0.383699 0.070233 5.463238 0.0000 
Tech 0.244375 0.090339 2.705080 0.0091 
Gmonths 0.110391 0.028514 3.871474 0.0003 
Lpropint 0.157076 0.075291 2.086253 0.0416 
Lngmarg 0.028268 0.036381 0.776990 0.4405 
R-squared 0.610325 Mean dependent var 6.413587 
Adj .R2 0.560731 S.D. dependent var 0.459142 
S.Error 0.304307 Sum squared resid 5.093166 
L. likelihood -10.16322 F-statistic 12.30620 
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The F-statistic for the short - run irrigation water demand equation of 12.3 is 
significant. This indicates that the variables included in the model are collectively 
significant in explaining short - run irrigation water demand; in other words, the 
model has explanatory power. The R-square statistic calculated for the output 
equation is 0.61, which implies that the model explains 61 per cent of the variation 
in short - run irrigation water demand across the 63 observations included in the 
analysis. All the coefficients do take the expected signs as hypothesised earlier 
except for the variable lpropint for which signs could not be determined a priori. 
As previously mentioned, given that the equation was estimated in log - log form, 
the coefficients may be interpreted as elasticities. 
The variable for the costs of pumping, Lpowerco (i.e. the proxy for water cost) 
takes on a negative sign as expected and has a coefficient of -0.04 but is, 
nonetheless, not-statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. The coefficient is 
only significant at the 11 per cent level which is slightly above the conventional 5 
to 10 per cent limit. Interestingly, this implies that water prices, or cost, is not a 
major determinant of irrigation water use. If the confidence limit were to be 
relaxed the coefficient would signify the modest inelasticity of water demand with 
respect to water costs as reflected by the proxy, irrigation power costs. This result 
is a critically important one for policy purposes. 
The coefficient of the crop price variable, /price, takes on the hypothesised sign 
and is significant at the 15 per cent confidence level. The coefficient could be 
interpreted to mean that the elasticity of short - run irrigation water demand with 
respect to crop price is low, i.e. 0.06. 
The coefficient of the fixed irrigation costs, lfcosts, not only has the hypothesised 
sign but is also statistically significant. This is an important finding for irrigation 
water - saving policy consideration. It indicates that once farmers have invested in 
irrigation outlays, which are often very costly, they will make good the use of such 
investment by applying as much water as the crops and climatic conditions will 
dictate with no significant attention or motivation to limiting irrigation water use. 
The coefficient may be interpreted that the higher the initial investment cost in 
irrigation outlays, the less inclined the farmer would be to limiting his per hectare 
irrigation water application. 
61 
The coefficient of the technology variable, tech, is statistically significant at the 1 
per cent level. The coefficient may be interpreted to mean that the elasticity of 
water demand with respect to the technology adopted -- sprinkler -- is low; it is 
relatively inelastic at 0.24. Since the variable was estimated in a dummy form 
taking the value 1 if sprinkler technology and O otherwise, the coefficient could be 
interpreted to imply that the short - run elasticity of water use for sprinkler 
irrigation systems is positive, but relatively inelastic. The low elasticity signifies 
the water - saving attributes of the technology in question, and thus provides an 
important consideration for policy purposes. 
The length of the crop - growing season, as represented by the variable gmonths, 
has a statistically significant coefficient and takes on the correct sign. As 
postulated earlier, crops that have longer growing seasons have higher irrigation 
water application requirements in both absolute and relative terms than do those 
with shorter period requirements; hence the positive relationship. The coefficient , 
0.11, may be interpreted to mean that the elasticity of short - run irrigation water 
demand with respect to the length of crop - growing season is inelastic. 
The variable lpropint was explained as reflecting the relative position of the 
individual farms with respect to their ability to cover their working costs. We 
noted that there was no a priori evidence for hypothesising either sign or direction 
of correlation. From the regression results, it is apparent that the relative farm 
indebtedness with regard to operating capital is positively correlated to irrigation 
water use. The coefficient of 0.15 can be interpreted to suggest that the short - run 
elasticity of irrigation water demand is quite low with respect to the farm's 
operating capital status. 
The variable, gmargin, does not influence short - run irrigation water demand as 
exemplified by its statistically insignificant coefficient. It does, however, take the 
hypothesised sign. 
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4.4 Technology choice equation 
As suggested in Chapter Three, the technology choice decision by irrigators is 
influenced by: the cost of the technology as reflected in the per hectare irrigation 
fixed cost; the per hectare power expenditure; the per hectare gross margin; water 
use; a region dummy talcing the value 1 if Free State and O if Transvaal; and the 
per hectare irrigation labour hours. The equation may be written as : 
Techsi = Al +l2fcosti -13 pricei +14 gmargini -15 powercoi +A(j regioni 
+ 17 /hoursi + ei 
Table 4.3 : Logit regression output : Technology choice equation 
LOGIT II Dependent Variable is TECHS 
Date: 08107195 
Sample: 1 63 
Included observations: 63 
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
c -12.24439 3.863546 
Price -0.348143 0.301219 
Gmargin 0.509731 0.358186 
Region 5.357385 1.692518 
Lhours 1.086472 0.518510 
Fcost 1.826037 0.856265 
Powerco -0.136724 0.497346 
Log likelihood -20.2 
Obs with Dep=l 31 











It can be observed from the regression output in Table 4.3, above, that all the 
coefficients take on the anticipated signs. It is also apparent that the price, gross 
margin and powercost variables are not significant in explaining technology 
choice. As has been mentioned earlier, the coefficients of the logit model are 
interpreted as describing the effect on the logarithm of the odds that either choice 
(i.e. discrete dependent variables) will be made given a set of independent 
variables. The coefficients of the regional dummy variable, the per hectare fixed 
costs and the per hectare irrigation labour requirements are positive and 
statistically significant. Since the interpretation of the overall goodness-of-fit for 
qualitative choice procedures uses the likelihood ratio test, the same procedure, as 
already applied in the crop choice equation, is undertaken here. The log -
likelihood estimate with the three restrictions is - 43. 9. Substituting this, and the 
log likelihood statistic in Table 4.3, for the unrestricted model into the log 
likelihood ratio test formular gives: 
-2[-20.2 - 43.9] -128.2 
Since the value computed above is greater than the critical value of chi square with 
six degrees of freedom at 5 per cent significance level (12.59), we may reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are equal to zero 
i.e. the restrictions do not apply. Thus, we may likewise conclude that the model, 
as a whole, has explanatory power. Likewise using the likelihood ratio index 
formular yields: 
p = 1 - L(,d)=l- - 20·2 =0.53 
L(O) -43. 9 
The above value is a pseudo R2 but may not be interpreted in the same manner one 
does normal R2. Never the less, the index of 0.53 gives a 'feel' of the 'performance' 
of the model. 
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4.5 The Output equation 
The per hectare crop output equation was modelled as a function of the per 
hectare water application, amount of labour hours and other inputs, applied, the 
position of the farm with regard to operating capital, the energy costs and the crop 
price. The model is functionally given below. 
Loutputi = 81 + 82 Lwateri + 83 Loglhrsi + 84 Lphcosti - 85 Lenergn - 86 
Lpricei + ei (76) 
The crop output model, as formulated above, was estimated using OLS estimation 
procedure. The variables are in log form, implying that they may be interpreted as 
elasticities. The ordinary least square estimates of the model are given in Table 
4.5 below. 
Table 4.4 : Regression output : crop output equation 
LS// Dependent Variable is LOUTPUT 
Date: 08/14/95 
Sample: 1 63 
included observations: 63 
Variabl Coefficient Std. Error 
e 
c 0.317254 1.592429 
Lwater 0.666731 0.213781 
Loglhrs 0.262894 0.089906 
Lphcost 0.396317 0.127851 
Lenergy -0.336527 0.133390 








R-squared 0.541685 Mean dependent var 
Adjusted R2 0.501482 S.D. dependent var 
S.Error 0.661990 Sum squared resid 













The F-statistic computed for the equation is significant, implying that the variables 
included in the model are collectively significant in explaining observed crop 
output per hectare. In other words, the model as a whole has explanatory power. 
The R-square statistic computed for the output equation is 0.54, which implies that 
the model explains only 54 per cent of the variation in the per hectare crop output 
across the 63 observations included in the analysis. All coefficients have the 
expected signs. The coefficient of !water, the amount of irrigation water applied, 
is positive as previously anticipated. The coefficient-statistic for !water was 
estimated as 0.68, and reveals that crop output is quite elastic with respect to 
irrigation water application, i.e. elasticity of 0.68. This result underscores there 
significant role that irrigation plays in crop production. 
The coefficient of the variable, Log/hrs, for amount of labour hours applied per 
hectare, also takes the anticipated sign. The coefficient, estimated at 0.26, may be 
interpreted to mean that the elasticity of output with respect to the amount of 
labour hours applied per hectare is low (0.26). This implies that output is quite 
inelastic or relatively unresponsive to variations in the amount of labour hours 
applied per hectare. The t-statistic computed for this variable is statistically 
significant. 
The coefficient of pre-harvest costs, lphcost, also has the expected sign. The 
coefficient estimate of 0.39 implies that the elasticity of output with respect to 
expenditures on inputs other than water and interest payments (previously defined) 
is quite low. The t-statistic for the coefficient is significant at 2 per cent level. 
The coefficient of the interest variable, lpropint, has the expected sign. The 
coefficient estimate of - 0.16 may be interpreted as implying that the elasticity of 
output with respect to interest payments is low. The result would have indicated 
that farms with higher debt obligations are, ceteris paribus, more likely to have 
lower per hectare outputs but the coefficient is, however, statistically 
insignificant. 
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The variable for energy use per hectare, /energy, also has the expected sign. It 
may be interpreted as the elasticity of output with respect to energy, we observe it 
is a low 0.33, i.e. it is rather inelastic. The t -statistic is significant at 1 per cent 
level. 
The last variable, /price, also has the expected sign. The coefficient of 0.68 may 
be interpreted that the elasticity of output with respect to crop prices is relatively 
elastic. This suggests a marked positive response in output to crop prices. 
Moreover, the t-statistic for the price coefficient is significant. It should be 
realised, however, that there is a likelihood of a possible dual causation between 
price and output. This is particularly the case for crops whose prices were not 
traditionally set by Marketing I Control Boards and which, therefore, were largely 
determined by market forces. Under such circumstances, use of at least three stage 
least squares, preferably simultaneous equations procedure would have been 
recommended. This has, however, been ignored for the reason that most of the 
crops in the sample had their prices set by the Boards and thus output levels do not 
influence prices. Thus, there is an unambiguous unidirectional causation from 
price to output and not vice versa. Secondly, even if the causation could not be 
determined on the basis of Board controlled prices, our sample size is too small to 
accommodate simultaneous equation estimation. 
4.6 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter, we have presented empirical results of the equations discussed in 
Chapter Three. This section highlighted the important empirical findings which 
have policy implications. These are followed up and discussed in Chapter 5. Here 
we compare and contrast our findings with those reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Our particular interest in the crop choice equation was to determine whether the 
water demand attributes of specific crops determine the probability of farmers 
choosing to grow a particular crop. In other words, to determine whether crop 
choice was sensitive to higher water costs. We modelled crop choice as a function 
of the per unit crop price, water demand, per hectare gross margin, its per hectare 
labour requirement and the circumstances regarding the farm's working capital and 
other input requirements. Obviously, the variable of special interest here is water 
use. Our results indicate that, on the whole, water use and by extension water 
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prices do not affect farmers' crop choice decisions. The most important variable is 
the per hectare gross margin associated with a particular line of production. All 
the other variables in the equation were not significant. This finding is in 
agreement with Howit et al (1990), whose study notes that the 1,927 farmers in 
their sample of the Western US, tend to adopt higher valued crops, in response to 
higher water prices, and that this shift had little to do with water - saving attributes 
of the crops per se. It does, however, contrast the finding of Kim et al (1990), 
who report that in the Ogallala acquifer of the Texas High plains, farmers 
responded by not only reducing water applied but, also by switching to higher 
value crops In our case, the statistical insignificance of the water demand variable 
in the crop choice equation does indicate that water price has an insignificant 
influence on crop choice. 
For the short - run water demand equation, our results indicate that the proxy for 
water cost, lpowerco, had a negative coefficient, as supported by theory; but this 
was, nonetheless, statistically insignificant. In other words, farmers' water use I 
consumption does not respond significantly to water cost. This finding is in 
agreement with the findings of Carey et al (1990), Just et al (1990b), Alouze C.M 
(1990), Antle and Hatchett (1990), Caswell et al (1990) and Clayton et al (1990). 
In the same vein, it is in contrast to the findings of Just et al (1990a), Burt et al 
(1990) and Kim et al (1990). 
The technology choice equation was designed to answer the question of whether 
water prices have a significant role in influencing the adoption of more water -
conserving irrigation technologies. Our estimates for the water cost proxy, 
powerco, is statistically insignificant. It is apparent from our results that it is not 
water cost that explains the choice of technology adopted, but the differing labour 
requirements for use with those technologies in question the capital costs per 
hectare occasioned by the choice of technology, and the disparities in regional 
characteristics as captured by the regional (dummy) variable. This important 
finding contrasts, for example, that of Howitt et al (1990) who, in their study of 
six counties of the San Joaquin Valley of California, found water cost to influence 
irrigation technology adoption. 
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The last equation estimated, per hectare crop output, yielded a statistically 
significant water use coefficient. This confirms the normal expectation of the 
critical role of water in irrigated agriculture as a determinant of farm output. This 
is in agreement with several other studies; e.g., Burt et al (1990). We turn to the 
policy implications for irrigated agriculture in the study region in particular and 
South Africa in general. This is the subject of Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTERS 
POLICY IMPLICATION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Policy Implications 
The empirical findings of the previous chapter have imp01tant policy implications 
that go beyond the narrow confines of irrigated agriculture. However, for the sake 
of limiting ourselves to more central issues, we shall here focus exclusively on the 
implications it does have for irrigation water policy. The conclusion to be drawn 
from our analysis, and one that most economists involved in the irrigation water 
research would not have initially expected, is that farmers consumption of water 
does not seem to respond to water prices in making their crop water application 
decisions. This result, however, is not difficult to comprehend. It results from the 
fact that water cost forms a modest proportion of a farmer's total production costs 
and therefore it need not significantly influence either the amount of irrigation 
water applied or the choice of crops or of technology. This suggests that changes 
in water prices, alone, will not be effective in achieving efficient water use in 
irrigated agriculture. This said, one needs to bear in mind that, in South Africa, the 
cost of irrigation water has been so low that farmers have had little reason to be 
significantly influenced by water prices in either irrigation water application, crop 
or technology choice. Moreover, many farmers received credit for installing 
irrigation and farm water improvements at preferential and concessionary terms. 
This made the development of on-farm irrigation infrastructure relatively 
inexpensive and, indeed, easy. It is clear, therefore, that the efficacy of pricing as a 
tool for efficient water use has been compromised by its unduly low cost and 
negligible weight in the farmers' production costs. Thus, it could still be relied 
upon, if, together with other measures to guide farmers towards efficient and more 
conservative use of this important input, its price were to approximate its 
opportunity cost and scarcity value. It is also clear that prices need not be used in 
isolation to effectively perform their imp01tant rationing function. This suggests 
that other forces, together with prices, must be relied upon to achieve and perform 
those functions that prices alone seemingly fail to perform. As a starting point, it 
might be useful for policy makers to note those functions, in addition to rationing, 
which water prices are expected to perform and then proceed to identify and 
assign alternate and or price-supporting policy prescriptions. 
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Specifically, it is anticipated that the pncmg of water should give users an 
incentive to pursue efficiencies in its utilisation. This is in stark contrast to the 
reality that in South Africa, water has hitherto been 'under-priced' as an economic 
good. Part of the explanation for this under-pricing, other than the political 
impmtance of farmers and the importance of agriculture in achieving security in 
food production ( especially during the era) is the widespread and misbegotten 
belief and conceptualisation of water as a 'free resource'. This belief, pervasive as 
it seems to be, necessarily has unfortunate consequences. These include conflicts 
between user sectors not only regarding the quantity available to the several 
sectors, but also conflicts regarding externalities which are not internalised into the 
costs to each user sector. For example, chemical pollution from irrigated 
agriculture and ground water depletion will affect industrial and domestic users. In 
short, water prices should encourage efficient utilisation, arbitrate and resolve inter 
and intra - sectoral allocations while minimising negative externalities. 
Secondly, pricing is intended and conceived as a tool for 'screening' and 
discouraging lower valued uses thereof, e.g. low - value irrigation crops. This 
would result in both optimal inter - and intra - sectoral allocation. Prices are thus 
envisaged to lead to a situation where water can thus be freed or transferred to 
more profitable uses. It is obvious that an effective performance of this role by the 
price mechanism would, in the long term, be of interest to both farmers and 
broader interest groups within the nation in so far as it encourages shifts into lines 
of production (crops) that are profitable, exportable, and.income and employment 
generating. Pricing is, thus, a tool for, amongst other things, increasing economic 
efficiency, encouraging growth as well as promoting environmental protection. 
In short, two issues are obvious: the first is that water must be priced to reflect its 
true opportunity cost; secondly, non - price policy tools exist that, together with 
correct pricing, should make those objectives contained in the last two paragraphs 
attainable. The issue of opportunity cost pricing of water is a contentious one. It 
should be clear that an attempt to "price water" as an economic resource via the 
price mechanism is likely to encounter political opposition as well as attract the 
opposition of various interest groups of water users. It is, thus, clear that even 
though the adoption of opportunity cost pricing is a desirable tool for proper 
resource management, the political costs of its implementation are certainly not 
negligible and need to be addressed. 
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Moreover, much as opportunity cost pncmg 1s theoretically appealing and 
consequently favoured by many economists, one should not, however, assume 
away the difficulties involved in devising such a policy. For example, the total 
opportunity cost must embody environmental and social costs and is a difficult 
goal to achieve. Perhaps it is this difficulty that has led to water authorities such as 
those in Israel to adopt a Cost - Plus pricing policy as opposed to a pure 
opportunity- cost - based pricing that economists would favour. It could be 
suggested that, as a starting point towards future opportunity cost based water 
pricing, cost-plus pricing could be implemented as a gradual free - market for 
irrigation water is considered. 
Leaving these two conceptual difficulties aside, there are yet other complications 
that an opportunity cost based irrigation water pricing policy cannot ignore. First, 
opportunity cost pricing cannot exist effectively in a situation where water markets 
are non - operational. To the extent that water markets are non - operative, true 
opportunity - cost based pricing will be illusory. Secondly, water markets are, 
themselves, tied to the legal status of water rights. For example, riparian rights 
presume that one has land entitlements. In South Africa, the skewed distribution 
of land ownership would mean that black farmers might as well have no, or few, 
riparian water rights. This importantly implies that land redistribution policies 
must go hand - in - hand with policies regarding water rights. Thirdly, it is 
important that irrigation water policy and pricing take due cognisance of the wider 
objectives of agricultural policy as contained in the 1995 White Paper on 
Agriculture which sets out the policy objectives for this decade. Notable 
objectives for which special attention needs to be taken include assuring low and 
stable prices for basic foods, consumed by, especially, low income earners; 
supporting the restructuring of the agricultural system and the transfer of 
ownership of agricultural resources, such as water, to redress the injustices 
created by apartheid; widening access to agricultural services; encouraging 
efficiency and sustainable practices in the allocation and use of agricultural 
resources so as to encourage economic growth, increased productivity and 
employment, among yet other objectives. (Backeberg et al; 1993). In other words, 
even if true opportunity cost water pricing were tenable, its implementation must 
take due cognisance of the diverse groups, objectives and functions within the 
agricultural sector. 
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It must be noted, however, that while prices are the conditio sine qua non for 
efficient water allocation in the future as competition for this vital, and scarce 
resource mounts, there are other complimentary, non- · price policy tools for 
enhancing efficient water use and its conservation. For example, Irrigation water 
use literature is abound with the contention that risk aversion, on the part of the 
farmer, is one of the causes of excessive water application beyond optimal levels. 
To the extent that this is true for South Africa, implies that policies that address 
crop insurance could have an indirect, but nonetheless important role to play in 
water conservation. Research and extension services are other important non -
price alternatives to irrigation water conservation. From the empirical analysis of 
Chapter 4, it is clear, for example, that the crop growing season length has a major 
influence on short run irrigation water demand. Over time, scientific research has 
been able to develop crop varieties that are not only high - yielding but which also 
mature early. Since crop season length has an important influence on short - run 
irrigation water demand, research into such varieties and purposeful extension 
services aimed at their adoption could complement price - based water 
conservation efforts. Indeed, there is much latitude for propagating and 
disseminating these ideals among emergent small scale farmers who are likely to 
benefit from land redistribution and who will obviously face more severe water 
scarcity problems than do their more established commercial farm counterparts. 
Additionally, there are other good reasons for stressing the importance of this 
point especially amongst emerging farmers. It is obvious that such farmers are not 
likely to enjoy · the same advantages in terms of access to fixed and operating 
capital credit at concessionary terms, as was the case with their commercial 
counterparts, and thus measures that do not interfere with input prices should be 
preferred as a means of assisting emerging small scale, black farming enterprises 
that will engage in irrigated agriculture. Secondly, small farmers are likely to have 
limited technical and managerial skills that are necessary for conservation -
oriented farm management practices. Therefore, these and other issues regarding 
the adoption of more efficient irrigation technologies are all central to a 
meaningful discourse regarding irrigation water price policy. 
As part of the non - price approach to irrigation water management, the influence 
of risk management in irrigation agriculture has been advanced in the literature on 
irrigation water conservation and is not without merit. Risk aversion has been 
given as a possible reason for intensive irrigation practices i.e. irrigation water 
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over application. This is a management, non - price approach to irrigation water 
conservation that merits further consideration especially as regards policies 
pertaining to crop insurance. It could be argued that where crop I agricultural 
activity risks are appropriately covered, farmers are expected to be largely less risk 
averse in making decisions and implementing changes in their farm businesses. In 
the context of this dissertation, such management changes hinge on greater 
reliance on crop insurance as a means of reducing the riskiness of farming and 
specifically in discouraging farmers from over-applying irrigation water. The 
point is that an effective insurance cover may substitute for water over-application 
as a form of insurance from the farmer's perspective. Crop insurance may, thus, 
provide a market-friendly support to the exclusive use of water-pricing or cost -
based approaches as the sole means of containing water over- use in irrigated 
agriculture. 
A further consideration m terms of irrigation water policy is that increased 
efficiency in irrigation water use requires a policy shift away from 'supply -
oriented' Engineers' approach that considers the development of new dams, canals, 
and irrigation water system as the sole means of addressing irrigation water 
shortages and more towards the management of demand, through a combination of 
price induced reallocation and demand management. It is thus imperative that 
policy makers think not in terms of what the crop's irrigation water demand is, but 
more towards, farmer's water demand for irrigation. The two need not be the same 
by definition and this has important implications for water conservation. Such a 
shift in policy would go a long way towards achieving sustainable development in 
irrigated agriculture in South Africa in the face of fierce competition for scarce 
public funds from other sectors such as health, education, housing and yet others 
or even between irrigation water supply and household water supply projects. 
Therefore, conservation will need to be encouraged through those of pricing 
mechanisms, new technologies, education and optimal management measures and 
not by supply-oriented new investments in irrigation water supply projects and 
schemes. 
Another approach that has been proposed as a measure to induce efficient water 
use in irrigated agriculture, and especially in those that are reliant on underground 
water, are pump taxes. The theoretical justification for such taxes is based on the 
need to combat common-pool externalities. In South Africa, however, there are 
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difficulties in this approach that prevent its immediate application. To begin with, 
the administration of the tax itself would be complicated and relatively expensive 
to implement. Secondly, complications arise with regard to water rights as 
presently constituted. Thirdly, and assuming that the tax could be implemented, 
the observed non responsiveness to water costs on the part of the farmers, as 
evident from empirical estimates in Chapter Four, indicates that one can only 
expect or anticipate relatively . modest reductions in per hectare water use from 
such a tax and yet more difficult adjustments as marginal farmers have to stop 
irrigating or leave farming business altogether. 
It is also important that irrigation water policy, especially to extent that the small -
scale, black farmer is going to be the focus of it, does not neglect an important 
dimension, gender. Women are likely to be affected in at least two ways. First, in 
the rural communities and amongst emergent black farmers, women provide the 
bulk of the labour force in agriculture and any effects of irrigation water policy 
that impacts either negatively or positively on the profitability of rural - small farm 
irrigated agriculture will certainly affect them. Policy makers must therefore at 
least anticipate some of these effects. It is common knowledge that new 
agricultural technologies , in particular those that enhance extensive land use via 
improved productivity and profitability, commonly increase demands on women's 
labour. Secondly, when discussing water prices, water markets and water rights 
that go with it, it is important to realise that women's inaccessibility to land would 
alienate them from effective access and ownership of water rights except, perhaps, 
only via common property arrangements embedded in the nuptial contracts with 
their husbands. It is important therefore that changes in the legal framework that 
are geared towards making water the economic good that it is via, for example, 
revision of water rights, must not lose sight of its implication to gender issues. 
Further, it is not just women that are likely to be negatively affected by such 
changes in water rights, the poor need to be taken into account as well. To the 
extent that riparian rights are dependent on whether one has property (land), and 
given the extent of landlessness, and the skewed distribution of land ownership in 
South Africa, it is imperative that such changes are carefully evaluated to ensure 
that they do not harm, especially, women and the poor 
Finally, a cautionary note is necessary. The results of this study are only as good 
as the assumptions and the data used in the analysis. While, for comparative 
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reasons, we have attempted to employ ( with modifications) one of the models that 
have been used in other studies, the data used in the analysis is secondary data and 
thus the results are perhaps less reliable than desirable. Secondly, the study has 
focused exclusively on farmers who did their own pumping, as opposed to those 
who received state subsidised, low - priced water, and therefore any comment 
made with regard to public irrigation schemes is based not on empirical analysis 
but the general literature on public irrigation schemes. Thirdly, the data and 
models estimated pertain to the Orange Free State and Transvaal provinces only. 
Whereas we believe that, the results may not be dramatically different in other 
provinces with regard to short - run agricultural water demand, we are reluctant to 
make policy suggestions for areas outside the study area, or blanket 
generalisations which may not necessarily be supported by the data. Subsequent 
research should examine yet more specific, and well defined regions. 
76 
5.2 Conclusion 
South African agriculture has witnessed phenomenal expansion, both in space and 
output, over the last decades. Central to this achievement has been irrigated 
agriculture. However, as population and industrial growth continue, inter - and 
intra - sectoral competition for water may be expected to intensify. It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that the scarcity value of water, in whatever use, will of 
necessity rise and its conservation become increasingly important. Since 
agriculture accounts for the largest single proportion of water use, it is imperative 
that conservation and proper pricing policies aimed at its efficient utilisation begin 
in this sector. One would expect water prices to play a leading role in this regard. 
One would further expect conservation and efficient utilisation of water in 
agriculture to be manifested in choice of high value crops and adoption of more 
efficient water conserving techniques and irrigation water demand that is quite 
elastic with respect to water price I cost. Our findings are, however, to the 
contrary. It is clear from our analysis that water prices neither affects the derived 
demand for irrigation water, nor does it feature prominently in decisions regarding 
conservation, crop and technology choice. We have indicated that the inefficacy 
of pricing as a tool in the performance of its functions in irrigation water 
management, to which we alluded earlier in this Chapter, may be due to the fact 
that irrigation the cost of irrigation water as a per cent of the farmers total variable 
cost, in South Africa is too low to solicit any appreciable response from them. 
Moreover, and much as proper pricing is critical for efficient irrigation water use, 
we have stressed that conservation and the achievement of other objectives with 
regard to water conservation need not be the preserve of water price policy alone. 
We have suggested other ways and means of ensuring the achievement of 
efficiency in irrigation water use which should enhance water conservation. Such 
measures included purposeful extension service and education into available and 
more efficient irrigation technologies, research into, and the adoption of, early 
maturing crop varieties, as well as the institutionalisation of crop insurance as 
possible ways of increasing water conservation and more efficient utilisation of 
water in irrigated agriculture. While these measures can enhance efficiency in 
water use, one role these alternative measures can not perform well is the 
allocative function, which, water price alone seem to have done well in other 
countries regarding the allocation and use of irrigation water and other resources. 
Our results, until now, could indicate that prices do not serve this allocation 
77 
function in South Africa as they appear to have done in other countries. Perhaps, 
with the passage of time and with reductions in input and output pricing policy 
distortions, prices will re-assert themselves as important determinant of the 
demand for this exceedingly important resource in irrigated agriculture. 
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Appendix 1 : Data Used in the analysis 
BUDGET ENERGY FCOST FUEL GMARGIN GMONTHS HVCROP INPUTS INTEREST 
241 3366 220 869 761 9 0 1013 130 
243 2062 62.55 495 355 5 0 1630 170 
244 2291 70 543 1528 6 0 1660 146 
245 3208 97 760 390 7 0 1966 143 
246 2368 71 561 9530 6 1 5300 386 
247 2520 76.45 597 1254 6 0 1467 152 
248 366 111 869 16126 7 1 2749 224 
256 2037 52.1 482 258 5 0 1169 118 
258 2040 52.1 483 1720 5 0 1709 124 
259 21122 54.07 500 766 6 0 1944 210 
261 616 13.82 146 1717 4 1 6196 477 
264 1258 28.19 298 1758 10 0 402 91 
275 339 34.7 80.37 2324 8 0 1179 107 
276 370 37.9 87.7 1598 5 0 801 98 
280 1602 41 .02 379 1758 6 0 2003 146 
281 2395 18.3 396 500 6 0 1969 166 
282 1702 43.5 403 143 6 0 1265 163 
283 1378 35.29 326 1302 5 0 1561 93.93 
284 1637 41 387 617 6 0 907 70 
286 2623 35.4 621 1958 7 0 1605 170 
287 2244 57 531 3570 6 1 1009 127 
288 4687 120 1110 1897 11 0 1927 140 
293 2497 255 591 2564 7 0 5147 540 
413 1998 89 473 2223 5 0 3817 196 
414 1156 91 274 4861 4 1570 119 
420 2361 145 559 2811 4 0 16627 2307 
421 809 36 191 1305 4 0 3521 106 
429 1233 55 292 8256 4 2481 170 
430 1230 55.14 291 5260 4 2913 95 
441 1850 82.9 438 4519 5 4827 338 
443 986 44.2 233 3294 7 1 1839 268 
444 809 36.28 191 9391 4 1 4021 140 
463 6622 200 1569 1878 4 0 22339 126 
572 6837 175 1620 128 4 0 1848 195 
573 2674 59 633 1020 4 0 2178 144 
593 1936 40.6 458 748 4 0 1660 97 
594 1233 55 292 936 5 0 1111 92 
597 4137 125 980 216 6 0 1332 151 
610 847 24 200 15.8 5 0 1717 250 
618 1356 60 321 571 5 0 792 77 
578 1973 88.4 467 2078 7 0 898 122 
579 5500 91 1303 1470 5 0 1422 158 
606 1846 41 437 651 6 0 921 119 
612 3846 49 911 253 5 0 1899 308 
619 1387 31 328 566 5 0 989 78 
448 1156 51 274 1874 4 0 1537 117 
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440 1850 83 438 3903 5 4471 178 
434 3545 208 840 5556 7 1 4390 344 
435 4586 157 1086 2187 6 0 1770 171 
452 1942 87 460 1374 6 0 12763 1004 
453 5781 259 1370 236 5 0 6982 520 
569 3787 114 897 1625 4 0 810 107 
584 1310 58.7 310 1244 6 0 3496 407 
585 1310 58 .7 310 1470 5 0 2586 212 
606 4877 102 1156 2137 6 0 2245 150 
616 2004 89 474 109 6 0 1615 110 
622 2062 86 488 3231 2 3566 148.3 
623 4675 196 1107 3231 7 1 3699 307 
624 3666 111 869 1611 3 0 2268 128 
625 2053 92 486 2843 7 0 1462 3072 
626 1190 53 282 2849 5 0 5820 722 
627 909 40 215 2257 4 0 8719 501 
629 1742 78 412 6395 6 7948 387 
BUDGET INTEREST IRIGMP MHOURS OUTPUT PHCOST POWERCOS PRICE 
241 130 0.165 66 17 2128 0.7242 280 
243 170 0.0102 37 6 2144 0.7242 330 
244 146 0.102 41 5.5 2379 0.7242 750 
245 143 0.102 58 2.6 2911 0 .7242 1500 
246 386 0.0102 43 2.4 6278 0.7242 1500 
247 152 0.0102 45.8 1.5 2249 0.7242 1824 
248 224 0.0102 66 30 3890 0.7242 986 
256 118 0.0072 27 8 1833 0.5925 330 
258 124 0.0072 27 6 2368 0.5925 750 
259 210 0.0071 28 3 2725 0.5925 1500 
261 477 0.0048 16.6 2.5 7222 0.293 1500 
264 91 0.0048 34 15 1417 0.293 280 
275 107 0.0075 18.3 5.5 1417 0.1462 750 
276 98 0.0075 20 7.5 1082 0.1462 330 
280 146 0.0071 21.37 6.5 2613 0.5925 750 
281 166 0.0019 64.7 10 2177 0.5925 330 
282 163 0.0071 22.7 7 1910 0.5925 330 
283 93.93 0.0071 18.38 2 1984 0.5925 1857 
284 70 0.0071 392 2.7 1438 0.5925 839 
286 170 0.0071 34 3.5 2499 0.5925 1500 
287 127 0.0071 29 2.45 1759 0.5925 1824 
288 140 0.0071 62 20 1458 0.5925 280 
293 540 0.0071 135 50 7118 0.7308 986 
413 196 0.0071 108 5 4667 0.7308 1541 
414 119 0.0202 62 2 2290 0.7308 638 
420 2307 0.0208 127 3.3 3893 0.505 3630 
421 106 0.0202 43 10 3311 0.7308 1168 
429 170 0.0202 66 18 3409 0.7308 990 
430 95 0.0202 66 2 2114 0.7308 677 
441 338 0.0202 100 26.8 5615 0.7308 367 
443 268 0.0202 53.3 2 2443 18.5 3200 
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444 140 0.0202 43 30 4426 35 1230 
463 126 0.0191 120 2.5 3687 1.357 4000 
572 195 0.0354 91 1.5 3687 2.962 2600 
573 144 0.0227 78 2.5 3001 1.34 970 
593 97 0.0233 52 3 2249 1.46 360 
594 92 0.0202 66 4 1534 0.7308 746 
597 151 0.0202 75 3 .8 2566 1.5 746 
610 250 0.0122 45 7 2194 0 .7308 350 
618 77 0.0202 73 2 .4 1258 0.7308 839 
578 122 0.0202 106 1.35 1586 0.7308 1825 
579 158 0.024 100 2 3049 2 .17 889 
606 119 0.0202 99.8 7 1573 0.7308 330 
612 308 0 .0397 207 4.15 3251 1.3919 1000 
619 78 0 .0202 75 2 1396 0.7308 427 
448 117 0 .0202 62 18 2255 0.7308 486 
440 178 0.0202 100 30 5157 0.7308 367 
434 344 0 .0207 191 3 5753 0.7308 4300 
435 171 0 .0182 83 2.2 3154 1.4293 3200 
452 1004 0.0202 103 4.5 15079 0.7308 1080 
453 520 0.0202 312 40 9134 0.7308 240 
569 107 0.0202 68 3.1 1910 1.508 674 
584 407 0.0202 70 2.5 4335 0.7308 1550 
585 212 0.0202 70.8 2.2 3126 0.7308 885 
606 150 0 .0233 131 8 3641 10461 235 
616 110 0.0233 108 4 2223 0.7308 600 
622 148.3 0.0233 37 3 37650 2.17 3200 
623 307 0.0305 85 3 5174 2.172 3200 
624 128 0.0305 66 1.19 3282 2.172 170 
625 3072 0.0202 111 2.189 50000 0.7308 7610 
626 722 0 .0202 64 2.189 59486 0.7308 7610 
627 501 0.0202 49 2 9688 0.7308 4840 
629 387 0 .0202 94 1.7 8758 0.7308 7610 
BUDGET PROFIT PRO PINT REGION TECH WATER 
241 -1.0283 0.06109 1 1 1200 
243 -1.79831 0.079291 1 2 675 
244 -0.44272 0.06137 1 2 750 
245 -2.01011 0.049124 1 2 1050 
246 0.417393 0.061485 1 2 775 
247 -0.58415 0.067586 1 2 825 
248 1.422024 0 .057584 2 1200 
256 -1.96075 0.064375 2 815 
258 -0.31972 0.052365 2 816 
259 -1.26904 0.077064 2 845 
261 0.897393 0.066048 1 2 500 
264 0.215635 0 .06422 1 2 1020 
275 0.494748 0.075512 2 549 
276 0.389942 0.090573 2 600 
280 -0.39632 0.055874 2 641 
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281 -1.4711 0.076252 2 1010 
282 -2.59201 0.08534 2 680 
283 -0.42121 0.047344 1 2 551 
284 -0.84614 0.048679 1 2 654 
286 -0.24397 0.068027 2 1049 
287 0 .70782 0.0722 2 897 
288 0.263208 0.096022 2 1875 
293 1.282462 0.075864 810 
413 -0.74166 0 .041997 2 1 648 
414 0.752692 0.051965 2 1 375 
420 -0 .32564 0.592602 2 1 1118 
421 -0.93105 0.032014 2 1 262 
429 0.884521 0.049868 2 1 400 
430 0.911549 0.044939 2 1 399 
441 -0.21715 0 .060196 2 600 
443 0.298876 0.109701 2 320 
444 0.752256 0.031631 2 262 
463 -0.67461 0.034174 2 1156 
572 -3.36054 0.052889 2 2 546 
573 -1.07914 0.047984 2 2 472 
593 -1.10084 0.04313 2 2 314 
594 -0.49402 0.059974 2 2 400 
597 -2.47483 0.058846 2 2 650 
610 -4.93347 0 .113947 2 2 275 
618 -0.78989 0.061208 2 440 
578 0.270191 0.076923 2 640 
579 -0.72955 0.05182 2 600 
606 -0.88223 0.075652 2 599 
612 -2 .55333 0.09474 2 655 
619 -0.90277 0.055874 2 450 
448 -0.18508 0.051885 2 375 
440 -0.27861 0.034516 2 600 
434 -0.03484 0 .059795 2 1150 
435 -0.36614 0.054217 2 760 
452 -0.09263 0.066583 2 630 
453 -3.65593 0.05693 2 1875 
569 -0.1616 0.056021 2 595 
584 -1.24839 0.093887 2 425 
585 -0.75449 0.067818 2 2 425 
606 -0 .53286 0.041197 2 2 791 
616 -3.01527 0.049483 2 2 650 
622 -2.45554 0.003939 2 1 225 
623 -0.47085 0 .059335 2 1 510 
624 -0 .7116 0 .039001 2 400 
625 -0 .56426 0.06144 2 666 
626 -0.73798 0.012137 2 1 386 
627 -1.45685 0.051713 2 2 295 
629 -0.31445 0.044188 2 2 565 
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Source: Combud, Directorate of Agricultural Economics, 1994 
Note: Variable Definitions 
Budget = Farm Budget Serial number 
Energy = Total energy used 
Fcost = Irrigation Investment Fixed Costs 
Fuel = Fuel budget 
Gmargin = Per hectare Gross margin 
Gmonths = Length of crop growing season (months) 
Hvcrop = Value based classification of crops (1= above mean, 0 = otherwise) 
Inputs = Expenditure on other inputs ( e.g. chemicals and fertilisers) other than 
water. 
Interest = Interest rate payment on operating capital credit 
Irigmp = Expenditure on irrigation machinery and parts 
Mhours = Machine hours 
Output = Output per hectare 
Phcost = Total preharvest cost per hectare 
Powercos = Unit power cost 
Price = Unit output price 
Profit = Per hectare profit 
Propint = Operating credit interest as a proportion of preharvest cost 
Region = Region identification dummy (1 = Transvaal, O= Orange Free State) 
Tech = Irrigation technology type (1 = sprinkler, 0 = centre pivot) 
water = Irrigation water applied per hectare 
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